UPDATE 6/21/14 11:56 PM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic video message and transcription:
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Dr. Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī — “Days With The Imām #4″ (En)
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UPDATE 6/15/14 2:22 PM: Here is an Arabic transcription of the below video message:
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Dr. Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī — “Days With The Imām #4″ (Ar)
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NOTE: Click here for previous parts in this series: #3, #2, and #1.
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Category: AQSL
As-Saḥāb Media presents a new video message from al-Qā’idah’s Shaykh Abū Khalīl al-Madanī: "Da'wah Lesson: Advice To All of the Fighting Groups In the Way of God"
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To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
As-Saḥāb Media presents a new video message from al-Qā’idah’s Dr. Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī: "Eulogy for the Martyr of the Fitnah Shaykh Abū Khālid al-Sūrī"
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To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
Member of Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām Leaks Unpublished Video Message from Adam Gadahan: "Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām: Extremists"
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To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
As-Saḥāb Media presents a new book from al-Qā’idah’s Dr. Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī: "The Winds of Paradise, 2nd Edition"
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Dr. Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī — “The Winds of Paradise, 2nd Edition”
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To inquire about a translation for this book for a fee email: [email protected]
As-Saḥāb Media presents a new trailer from al-Qā’idah: "Coming Soon: Resurgence"
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To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
The Clairvoyant: The Guidelines: Measuring Zawahiri's Influence
NOTE: For prior posts in The Clairvoyant sub-blog you can view an archive of it all here.
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Over the past few years since the American operation against Usama bin Ladin in Pakistan, there has been much debate over the leadership capabilities and influence that Bin Ladin’s successor Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri still has over the global jihadi movement generally and al-Qaeda branches in particular. Endowing al-Qaeda franchise-status upon Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin in Somalia, slow response to the Arab uprisings, and inability to resolve the conflict in Syria between the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra highlight how many have become skeptical of Zawahiri’s importance or relevance. And while this is all certainly true, those within the movement that are still true believers in the cause and view Zawahiri and al-Qaeda’s general command (AQGC) in Pakistan/Yemen as the fountainhead of the jihad against the Zionists and Crusaders still heed Zawahiri’s advice.
One potential area of measuring this is the guidelines that Zawahiri released for the movement in September 2013. In some ways, it is a codification of issues and ideas that Zawahiri and Atiyatallah ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Libi argued for in letters to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi last decade when attempting to reign in his excesses during the Iraq jihad. Two recent examples highlight how those that are still loyal to Zawahiri and AQGC have internalized these guidelines. Recently, both al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzam Brigades (AAAB) apologized for killing civilians and non-combatants in their military operations (more on this below). While not seeming like much, it highlights how those that are tied to AQGC have become very sensitive to Muslim public opinion as well as the movement becoming more mature, even if it is still ideologically fringe and militarily radical overall.
Here are some examples from Zawahiri’s guidelines:
- Avoid fighting the deviant sects such as Rawafidh, Ismailis, Qadianis, and deviant Sufis, except if they fight the Ahl as Sunnah.
- Avoid meddling with Christian, Sikh and Hindu communities living in Muslim lands.
- Refrain from killing and fighting against non-combatant women and children, and even if they are families of those who are fighting against us, refrain from targeting them as much as possible.
- Refrain from harming Muslims by explosions, killing, kidnapping or destroying their wealth or property.
- Refrain from targeting enemies in mosques, markets and gatherings where they mix with Muslims or with those who do not fight us.
While there is not definitive proof, it is likely that these guidelines helped inform the responses of AQAP and AAAB to acts committed that they then either regretted or realized could harm their public image and therefore apologized and then noted how it was outside the normal framework for how they interpret the shari’a and operate in the battlefield.
On December 21, 2013, AQAP’s military commander Qasim al-Raymi released a video message titled “Comment on the Targeting of the Defense Ministry in Sana’a’” apologizing for members of his organization killing medics and patients in the military hospital as well as those in the prayer room within the ministry. Al-Raymi stated: “We do not fight in this manner, and this is not what we call people to do. This is not our manhaj (methodology) … We confess to this mistake and fault. We offer our apologies and condolences to the families and the victims.” He later offered blood money compensation and medical treatment to the individuals and families affected by the attack.
More recently, on March 7, 2014, AAAB released a statement titled “On the Raid of the Iranian Chancellery in Beirut” claiming that there was faultiness in the second suicide bombers belt. It stated: “The two bombs were meant to be in a place where the explosion would not reach the main road and cause damage to passersby … The military operations of the ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzam Brigades do not target Shiites, or other sects.” Rather the attack was aimed at Hizb Allah, which while Shi’a is actively militarily fighting Sunnis in Syria. Illustrating how AAAB wanted to show that they were attempting to be discriminant in targeting and only defensively responding to attacks upon them and their fellow Sunni Muslim brethren.
Both of these examples highlight that the groups that still maintains allegiance to AQGC have become more astute and smarter in how they massage public opinion. That does not mean though they are now all of a sudden moderate actors. To the contrary, this past week for example, AQAP crucified a man for allegedly spying on them to help with drones strikes, while AAAB’s allies in Syria Jabhat al-Nusra still are actively beheading individuals on the battlefield that fight for the Assad regime (see both graphic photos below).
That being said, it appears that in some areas jihadi groups aligned with Zawahiri and AQGC are indeed listening to his advice and actively attempting to be more mature and pragmatic actors in some aspects. This is in contradistinction with the now rival global jihadi faction ISIS, which appears to have no rules of engagement and does as it pleases no matter what the consequences. How these guidelines continue to play out and what impact they may have with the AQGC-aligned groups remains to be seen, but it appears that as of now it has made slight differences in their on the battlefield methodologies, albeit imperfectly.
al-Manārah al-Bayḍā' Foundation for Media Production presents a new audio message from Jabhat al-Nuṣrah's Abū Muḥammad al-Jawlānī: "I Wish You Were Eulogizing Me"
Abū Muḥammad al-Jawlānī — “I Wish You Were Eulogizing Me”
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To inquire about a translation for this audio message for a fee email: [email protected]
New statement from Jabhat al-Nuṣrah: "Condolences on the Killing of Shaykh Abū Khālid al-Sūrī"
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — “Condolences on the Killing of Shaykh Abū Khālid al-Sūrī”
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To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]
Check out my new ‘Policy Alert’ for the Washington Institute: "Al-Qaeda Disaffiliates with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham"
On the evening of February 2, al-Qaeda’s general command released a statement disavowing itself from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS): “ISIS is not a branch of the Qaidat al-Jihad [al-Qaeda’s official name] group, we have no organizational relationship with it, and the group is not responsible for its actions.” This is the first time in al-Qaeda’s history that the group has publicly disaffiliated itself with a group bearing its name — even though ISIS has not used the name “al-Qaeda” since 2006. While it remains too early to know its effect in the Syrian context, the statement is significant nonetheless — both historically and for what it means for the broader global jihadist movement.
Al-Qaeda’s repudiation of ISIS is highly reminiscent of the withdrawal of support by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Abu Qatada al-Filistini, and Abu Musab al-Suri from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in 1996 during the Algerian civil war. Usama bin Laden himself was highly skeptical of the GIA when it denied his request to set up training camps in Algeria, and he worried that the group had a troublesome ideology. Bin Laden even played a role in the creation of a less radical Algerian splinter entity known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in 1998, which changed its name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 2007.
Similar to the current situation in Syria, the GIA began confronting other Islamists instead of fighting the Algerian regime. Most notably, the GIA killed Muhammad Said and Abdelrazak Redjam, leaders of the branch of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) that merged with the GIA in 1994, as well as killing Libyan volunteers from the LIFG. Like the GIA, ISIS’s overuse of takfir (pronouncing a Muslim an infidel) and subsequent liquidation of enemies by any means has been a source of intense grievance from other Syrian rebel groups, as has ISIS’s unwillingness to submit to an independent sharia court and its belief that it is a sovereign state in liberated territory. Acting on this belief, ISIS has extrajudicially killed, imprisoned, and punished other rebels and civilians in northern Syria.
The lessons of Algeria played an important role when al-Qaeda first took umbrage at excesses by al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers (better known as AQI and one of ISIS’s earlier names) in Iraq during the last decade, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was still the leader. One of the letters al-Qaeda sent in 2005 to Zarqawi was from Atiyah Allah Abd al-Rahman al-Libi, one of the Libyans who went to Algeria and survived any onslaught from the GIA. The letter advised Zarqawi not to be so brutal and to focus the group’s efforts on the American forces. Libi’s lesson from the Algerian experience centered on the importance of not shedding innocent Sunni Muslim blood and the consequences it could create.
Since then, al-Qaeda’s senior leadership in Pakistan has implored its branches to refrain from attacking Sunni Muslim civilians and to focus rather on security and military personnel and their infrastructure. And on the whole, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen and Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda’s preferred branch in Syria) have stuck to this framework, even though there has been some collateral damage. ISIS has been the exception.
While al-Qaeda’s announcement officially ends an imperfect relationship that began in 2004, signs of a rift date back to May 2013. Following ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s April 2013 announcement of the extension of the Islamic state into Syria, Ayman al-Zawahiri tried and failed to nullify Baghdadi’s power play, calling for ISIS to stay in Iraq and allow Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) to be the preferred actor in Syria. In defiance, Baghdadi released an audio message stating ISIS would remain in Syria and would not adhere to a division based on the Sykes-Picot deal from World War I.
Click here to read the rest.