Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — “Condolences on the Killing of Shaykh Abū Khālid al-Sūrī”
_________
To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]
On the evening of February 2, al-Qaeda’s general command released a statement disavowing itself from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS): “ISIS is not a branch of the Qaidat al-Jihad [al-Qaeda’s official name] group, we have no organizational relationship with it, and the group is not responsible for its actions.” This is the first time in al-Qaeda’s history that the group has publicly disaffiliated itself with a group bearing its name — even though ISIS has not used the name “al-Qaeda” since 2006. While it remains too early to know its effect in the Syrian context, the statement is significant nonetheless — both historically and for what it means for the broader global jihadist movement.
Al-Qaeda’s repudiation of ISIS is highly reminiscent of the withdrawal of support by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Abu Qatada al-Filistini, and Abu Musab al-Suri from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in 1996 during the Algerian civil war. Usama bin Laden himself was highly skeptical of the GIA when it denied his request to set up training camps in Algeria, and he worried that the group had a troublesome ideology. Bin Laden even played a role in the creation of a less radical Algerian splinter entity known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in 1998, which changed its name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 2007.
Similar to the current situation in Syria, the GIA began confronting other Islamists instead of fighting the Algerian regime. Most notably, the GIA killed Muhammad Said and Abdelrazak Redjam, leaders of the branch of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) that merged with the GIA in 1994, as well as killing Libyan volunteers from the LIFG. Like the GIA, ISIS’s overuse of takfir (pronouncing a Muslim an infidel) and subsequent liquidation of enemies by any means has been a source of intense grievance from other Syrian rebel groups, as has ISIS’s unwillingness to submit to an independent sharia court and its belief that it is a sovereign state in liberated territory. Acting on this belief, ISIS has extrajudicially killed, imprisoned, and punished other rebels and civilians in northern Syria.
The lessons of Algeria played an important role when al-Qaeda first took umbrage at excesses by al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers (better known as AQI and one of ISIS’s earlier names) in Iraq during the last decade, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was still the leader. One of the letters al-Qaeda sent in 2005 to Zarqawi was from Atiyah Allah Abd al-Rahman al-Libi, one of the Libyans who went to Algeria and survived any onslaught from the GIA. The letter advised Zarqawi not to be so brutal and to focus the group’s efforts on the American forces. Libi’s lesson from the Algerian experience centered on the importance of not shedding innocent Sunni Muslim blood and the consequences it could create.
Since then, al-Qaeda’s senior leadership in Pakistan has implored its branches to refrain from attacking Sunni Muslim civilians and to focus rather on security and military personnel and their infrastructure. And on the whole, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen and Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda’s preferred branch in Syria) have stuck to this framework, even though there has been some collateral damage. ISIS has been the exception.
While al-Qaeda’s announcement officially ends an imperfect relationship that began in 2004, signs of a rift date back to May 2013. Following ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s April 2013 announcement of the extension of the Islamic state into Syria, Ayman al-Zawahiri tried and failed to nullify Baghdadi’s power play, calling for ISIS to stay in Iraq and allow Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) to be the preferred actor in Syria. In defiance, Baghdadi released an audio message stating ISIS would remain in Syria and would not adhere to a division based on the Sykes-Picot deal from World War I.
Click here to read the rest.
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: al-Qā’idah — “On the Relationship of Qā’idat al-Jihād and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām”
Here is an English translation: al-Qā’idah — “On the Relationship of Qā’idat al-Jihād and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām” (En)
_________
To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]
NOTE: An archive of the Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad column can be found here.
–
“They have closed ranks and pledged bay’ah to Baghdadi”: Nasheed for the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham
By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Preface
This is an Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham nasheed released earlier in 2013 (around September time) and translated by me below. The term bay’ah means a pledge of allegiance, and in this case it is to ISIS’ leader Sheikh Baghdadi: a fundamental aspect of joining ISIS, not requiring a bay’ah to Sheikh Zawahiri of al-Qa’ida Central (see my previous Jihadology post for more information).
On the other hand, pledging allegiance to Sheikh Zawahiri, according to the testimony related to me by a representative of the Katiba Mus’ab bin Umair- a Deraa-based battalion that recently pledged allegiance to Jabhat al-Nusra- is a key part of properly integrating into Jabhat al-Nusra, Syria’s official al-Qa’ida affiliate that has emphasized its loyalty to al-Qa’ida Central by calling itself “Tanzim al-Qa’ida fi Bilad ash-Sham.”
Contrasting with this point, a representative of Jabhat al-Nusra in Qalamoun, which vowed to protect members of ISIS on the grounds of having the same manhaj (ideological program: i.e. Caliphate and world domination) even as the “politics” differ, affirmed to me that the political difference between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS is that the latter has no bay’ah to Sheikh Zawahiri.
This point is corroborated by some more testimony I recently gathered from members and supporters of ISIS. Thus, one native Syrian member of ISIS from Aleppo denied to me the existence of an ISIS bay’ah to al-Qa’ida central and affirmed to me that the original al-Qa’ida in Iraq had pledged bay’ah to and thus was absorbed by the Islamic State. Prominent ISIS source and supporter who used the Twitter handle zhoof (who is notably anti-Jabhat al-Nusra, deridingly referring to it on occasion as the “Jowlani Front”) elaborated to me further on whether ISIS has bay’ah to Sheikh Zawahiri:
“Zawahiri is a soldier with Mullah Omar, so if there is a bay’ah [from ISIS to al-Qa’ida Central], it will be to Mullah Omar, but all that there is of bay’ah is on Nusra which Sheikh Baghdadi established for Zawahiri, but every word Baghdadi utters is as though he is under bay’ah to Zawahiri as his sheikh, and this is from the discipline and humility of the sheikh [Baghdadi].”
In objection to these points, it is argued that if ISIS were really independent of al-Qa’ida Central, why does Sheikh Baghdadi not simply say so explicitly? Indeed, he has made no explicit declaration of a break, but I would argue that this is so because it would simply stir up too much fitna in the global jihadist movement. After all, Sheikh Baghdadi understands that al-Qa’ida Central is ultimately working towards the same ideological goals, so why bother deepening an already serious disagreement?
In short, as Will McCants says, Sheikh Baghdadi is playing a “clever game.” I would also agree with McCants about being skeptical of ISIS supporters’ and members’ narrative of the independence of the Islamic State from al-Qa’ida Central from the very beginning with its founding in late 2006, for there is no doubt that al-Qa’ida in Iraq was initially the main component of the Islamic State.
In any case, the lack of an explicit leadership declaration of independence does not mean there is no independence. On this reasoning, one could argue that the Green Battalion- a muhajireen battalion founded by Saudis last summer and primarily operating in Damascus province- is not an independent group. However, all reliable testimony on the ground (e.g. my interview with the Jabhat al-Nusra in Qalamoun representative) points to its independence.
Though it shares the ideology of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, the Green Battalion is independent for “personal reasons”: that is, its founders and leaders had personal problems with ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra in that they preferred not to take sides in the dispute over Sheikh Baghdadi’s announcement of a merger. Of course, it is not advantageous to anyone to declare explicitly a break of this sort.
Translation of the Nasheed
“They have closed ranks and pledged bay’ah to Baghdadi,
For [he is] our amir in our Iraq and ash-Sham.
For the Caliphate of God: I am its sign,*
Its glory decreed by our blood.
They have promised each other to protect its [the Caliphate’s] corners,
They have sold life at a cheap price for its survival.
They have closed ranks and pledged bay’ah to Baghdadi,
For [he is] our amir in our Iraq and ash-Sham.
They have undertaken bay’ah together to our amir,
They are your heroic knights and our weapon.
For he [Baghdadi] is the one to whom bay’ah is pledged in our land of Iraq
And [he is] the amir of the Muslims and of our land of Sham.
They have closed ranks and pledged bay’ah to Baghdadi,
For [he is] our amir in our Iraq and ash-Sham.
Preserve the soldiers of God, oh custodian of ours.
The cross has returned to our land and our abodes.
And on our skulls will be our life,
Laying low and vanquishing oppression, our enemy.
They have closed ranks and pledged bay’ah to Baghdadi,
For [he is] our amir in our Iraq and ash-Sham.
We have not forgotten the incident of the throwers,**
Verily it is an excellent lesson for whomsoever after it,
When some of the throwers resisted our Prophet,
For grace remains on our heroes [?].***
They have closed ranks and pledged bay’ah to Baghdadi,
For [he is] our amir in our Iraq and ash-Sham.”
Further Notes
* cf.My previous post for Jihadology in which I discuss ISIS discourses focus on establishing the Caliphate.
**- cf. This video lecture by Yahya Abd al-Rahman.
**- I am slightly uncertain about this phrase. Alternative suggestions are welcome.
UPDATE 2/4/14 10:55 AM: Here is an Arabic transcription of the below video message:
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Dr. Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī — “Emancipation From Futility and Failure” (Ar)
___________
—
__________
To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
Audio:
Dr. Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī — “Urgent Call to Our People in al-Shām”
Arabic Transcription:
Dr. Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī — “Urgent Call to Our People in al-Shām”
__________
To inquire about a translation for this audio message for a fee email: [email protected]
__________
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Muḥammad bin Maḥmūd al-Baḥṭīṭī (Abū Dujānah al-Bāshā) — “Stances on the Events in Egypt”
_________
To inquire about a translation for this article for a fee email: [email protected]
UPDATE 12/2/13 1:16 PM: Here is an Arabic transcription of the below video message:
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Adam Gadahan — “The Crime of Kidnapping Abū Anas al-Lībī and Its Implications” (Ar)
___________
—
