Check out a new report I co-authored with Jeffrey White and Andrew J. Tabler for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy: "Syria's Military Opposition: How Effective, United, or Extremist?"

NOTE: The chapter I wrote I completed in late April so it’s slightly dated, but still useful information on Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham. I will soon have a two part article on assessing the first few months of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s activities, which will complement the work in this particular report.
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Many options for direct military action in Syria have been on the table, ranging from token strikes with small numbers of weapons to much broader operations such as attacks on leadership targets or the imposition of no-fly and no-drive zones. In addition, the United States could respond indirectly by providing truly significant military assistance to the rebels. The recent chemical warfare attack, however, has rendered urgency to a considered U.S. response. Despite the Obama administration’s aversion to using military power in Syria and the difficulty of forging allied consensus on goals and methods, the Assad regime must be held accountable.
Nevertheless, the risk-benefit calculus for any decision depends, at the very least, on a thorough understanding of the disparate ideologies that drive the Syrian opposition, their military inadequacies, and their ability to create a unified political structure. To clarify these issues, Jeffrey White, Andrew J. Tabler, and Aaron Y. Zelin, all respected experts on Syria, present their findings in this Washington Institute Policy Focus, which has been updated to accommodate the most recent developments in this ongoing humanitarian crisis.
Click here to read the full report (48 pages).