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Hizballah Cavalcade: Asa’ib al-Muqawama al-Bahrainia: An Emerging Militant Group in Bahrain?

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

Asa’ib al-Muqawama al-Bahrainia: An Emerging Militant Group in Bahrain?

By Phillip Smyth

Asaib al-Muqawama al-Bahraini

Figure 1: Asa’ib al-Muqawama al-Bahrainia’s logo.

Asa’ib al-Muqawama al-Bahrainia (The League of Bahraini Resistance or AMB) was first established and marketed as an independent militant organization on February 22, 2014. The group’s founding announcement claimed that the time had become ripe for armed opposition against Bahrain’s ruling monarchy due to the government’s actions. As with other Bahraini militant groups, little is known about AMB’s manpower or armed capabilities.

Regardless, unlike other Bahraini militant organizations, AMB’s founding announcement has found its way onto many different online venues catering to a wide range of readers.[1]

AMB’s statements appear online in bursts. February 22 and February 28, 2014 have been the two dates this organization has placed a series of announcements in public. This pattern is reminiscent of another Bahraini organization, a proto-militant group which went by a similar name, Asa’ib al-Muqawama (The Resistance League). Using Twitter, Asa’ib al-Muqawama released 33 announcements (in both Arabic and English) between April 21 and 22, 2012. Asa’ib al-Muqawama’s threats centered on Bahrain’s controversial Formula One race. One of these statements claimed responsibility for planting three homemade bombs at the race location.  At time, there were also instances of Molotov cocktails being thrown at some (from Team India) affiliated with the race.[2] Additionally, on April 9, 2012, seven Bahraini police were wounded due to an improvised bomb planted in the town of Akr.[3] Albeit, neither of these attacks were linked to Asa’ib al-Muqawama.

After their last tweet on April 22, 2012, Asa’ib al-Muqawama went quiet. This is similar to how AMB went silent after their last February 28, 2014 statement. There is a possibility of a link between AMB and Asa’ib al-Muqawama, considering the groups espouse the same militarism, utilized a similar name, and have released announcements in bursts over two-day periods. In fact, AMB’s official Twitter account also describes itself as “Asa’ib al-Muqawama.” It is possible that AMB developed out of the original Asa’ib al-Muqawama. However, beyond these assumptions, there is little substantiating open-source information to assist in confirming any links.

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Figure 2: Asa’ib al-Muqawama’s English language Tweet-announcement, declaring they had planted 3 bombs at the Bahrain F1 race.

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Figure 3: Asa’ib Muqawama’s logo.

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Figure 4: AMB’s first announcement.

On February 28, 2014 AMB announced the launch of their, “Fist of Righteousness” operation to avenge the death of Ja’afar al-Derazi. Derazi, whose burial occurred the day of the announcement, was a 22 year old anti-government activist. According to opposition and pro-Iran sources, Derazi died due to torture and other forms of maltreatment when he was detained within a government jail cell.[4] In revenge for Derazi’s death, on April 11, 2014, Saraya al-Mukhtar claimed responsibility for an attack targeting Bahraini police. Nevertheless, AMB has not yet claimed any other attacks as part of their “Fist of Righteousness” campaign.

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Figure 5: AMB’s second announcement from February 28, 2014.

AMB Joins YouTube

AMB’s official YouTube account claimed to release a video introducing the group on February 21, 2014. However, the first publicly accessible copy of the video was uploaded and released on February 22, 2014. In the video, supposed AMB members are shown marching in formation, extending their arms in a Roman salute. Demonstrating their potential roots as militant offshoots of the larger Bahraini protest movement, young balaclava wearing men hold tires in one of their displays. Tires are a regular feature in some protests; often laid across stretches of road, coated in gasoline, and lit on fire.

Furthering religious themes was also a feature of the film. Young marching militants are seen holding Qurans, wearing white (in addition to other colors) burial shrouds symbolizing a willingness to be martyred, and holding flags with “Ya Husayn” (“O Husayn”) written on them. The “Ya Husayn” flags symbolize a Shia-centric theme, recalling Husayn’s martyrdom via beheading, at the pivotal Battle of Karbala.[5] These flags have also made regular appearances during anti-government protests.

The promotional clip also claims to show AMB launching operations against internal security elements (primarily the Bahraini police). Segments of film featuring Molotov throwing youths are a main theme. However, these clips are usually from earlier films recorded by more violent activists associated with the February 14 Youth Coalition. It is possible this footage demonstrates a further link to the February 14 Youth Coalition or it was simply repackaged by AMB to show a broader theme surrounding the “resistance” against the Bahraini government and their forces.

AMB also appears to have a preoccupation with utilizing weapons which can burn their foes. This may be the result of protester use of Molotov cocktails. Utilizing the limited available tools, some Bahraini protesters, particularly younger male militants, have often thrown Molotov cocktails at Bahraini internal security forces. The theme of the Molotov thrown at Bahraini police, particularly their vehicles, was regularly utilized in AMB’s introductory video. However, the focus on using weapons which can kill and injure using fire does not appear to stop with Molotovs. In one part of their video, AMB shows Bahraini police engulfed in a wall of flame, likely caused by a bomb or another incendiary device.

AMB’s Badge

AMB’s logo may also show links to Saraya al-Ashtar (SaM), one of the first publicly established Bahraini militant organizations. Featuring two crossed M16-style rifles within a circle (which could potentially symbolize a pearl, a recognized emblem of Bahrain), the group’s logo mirrors SaM’s official symbol. This logo also included two crossed rifles (albeit, of the Kalashnikov variety) within a circle representing a pearl.

An Asa’ib of Their Own?

When investigating potential links between AMB, Iran, or Iranian-backed proxies, there was some evidence of overlap between AMB & Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). On March 13, 2014, AMB’s founding statement was circulated on AAH’s extensive network of Facebook pages. This often coincided with claims that AMB was representative of AAH’s spreading brand. Claims of this nature may be an Iranian proxy attempt to demonstrate a substantial link to the Bahraini militant group. Both groups utilize similar language, with AMB describing itself as the “Bahraini Resistance” and AAH calling itself the, “Islamic Resistance in Iraq.”  Still, there is the possibility that AAH could be jumping on an organically constructed (in Bahrain) group while skillfully playing on AMB’s similar name, all in an effort to claim a connection and demonstrate a broader reach. It is important to note that it took AAH nearly a month before pages associated with the group started to carry AMB’s founding statement.

Another potential link includes religious and ideological themes. The AMB’s founding statement mentioned the group was following their taklif. A taklif, or religiously mandated order, was developed and utilized for political and social events by those embracing Iranian Islamic Revolutionary concepts.[6] The mention of a taklif mirrors a similar statement made by fellow Bahraini militant group, Saraya al-Mukhtar, which also mentioned they were picking-up arms against the government due to a taklif.

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Figure 6: A post promoting the first AMB declaration on an official Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Facebook page.

Is AMB Dormant?

At the time of this writing, the last statement issued by AMB was released via their Twitter account on February 28. Since that time, AMB has not itself claimed any new attacks, seen related militant groups, protest organizations, or the official Bahraini media, cite any new actions by the group. While little has been heard from this organization since it’s nearly 2 month-long period of silence, AMB’s release of formal statements, broad web-presence (including their YouTube video release), overlap between itself and other Bahraini militant groups, and other attack claims, may indicate AMB is still active.

AMB’s activities may be continuing as members of the organization act as integral elements within other Bahrain militant groups. If there is a true link between the AMB and Asa’ib al-Muqawama, it is possible that following the established model, a new wave of attack-claims could be registered on an entirely new online/social networking apparatus.

Nevertheless, until AMB claims another attack or has an allied organization claim an attack for them, it will be impossible to know what has become of this group

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[1] Note: Numerous Sunni Islamist and Shia Islamist forums, Facebook pages, and Twitter profiles have all spread around AMB’s founding statement.

[2] See: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/formulaone/article-2131934/Bahrain-Grand-Prix-2012-Force-India-caught-petrol-bomb-attack.html.

[3] See: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17663642.

[4] See: http://alwefaq.net/cms/2014/02/28/27444/. This post was written by the main Bahraini opposition party, Al-Wefaq. See also: http://www.almanar.com.lb/adetails.php?fromval=2&cid=221&frid=21&seccatid=221&eid=760912. This article originated from Lebanese Hizballah’s Al-Manar TV network

[5] See: http://books.google.com/books?id=Idp6FWByq6oC&pg=PT191&dq=beheaded+Husayn+battle+of+karbala&hl=en&sa=X&ei=37xQU_DtFIWR0QHI_ICQBA&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=beheaded%20Husayn%20battle%20of%20karbala&f=false.

[6] http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/10/hizballah-executing-syrian-prisoners.html. See my writing about the relevance of the Taklif Sharii among Hizballah and allied Iraqi Shia Islamist groups.

New statement from Jabhat al-Nuṣrah in Lebanon: “Blessed Martyrdom Operation on the Stronghold of the Dreaded Ḥizb Irān in the Region of al-Nabī ‘Uthmān”

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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Jabhat al-Nuṣrah in Lebanon — “Blessed Martyrdom Operation on the Stronghold of the Dreaded Ḥizb Irān in the Region of al-Nabī ‘Uthmān”

__________

Source: http://justpaste.it/nabyothman

To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: azelin@jihadology.net

Hizballah Cavalcade: Bahrain’s Saraya al-Muqawama al-Sha’biya: Militants of the February 14 Youth Coalition

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

Bahrain’s Saraya al-Muqawama al-Sha’biya: Militants of the February 14 Youth Coalition

By Phillip Smyth

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Figure 1: Saraya al-Muqawama al-Sha’biya’s logo.

Saraya al-Muqawama al-Sha’biya (The Popular Resistance Brigades or SMS), sometimes also called Saraya al-Muqawama (The Resistance Brigades), was listed by the government of Bahrain as a terrorist organization following the deadly March 3, 2014 bombing. The group, along with fellow militant group Saraya al-Ashtar, claimed responsibility for the attack. SMS has been operationally active and publishing its activities online since April 2012. Importantly, Saraya al-Muqawama al-Sha’biya does not hide that they are affiliated with one of the main anti-government protest groups, the February 14 Youth Coalition (which was also listed as a terrorist organization by the government of Bahrain). This is hardly a minor connection, since, both the February 14 Youth Coalition and SMS have also distributed images sharing one another’s logos, organized events (such as protests) together, and share a similar narrative. Other militant groups—namely Saraya al-Ashtar and Saraya al-Mukhtar—have only vaguely claimed to represent links to protestors, let alone main protest organizations.

In June 2013, the Bahraini government accused the February 14 Youth Coalition of having a “spiritual leader” based in Karbala, Iraq and of, “frequently travel[ing] between Iran, Iraq and Lebanon to obtain financial and moral support as well as weapons training.” However, Bahraini authorities provided little substantiating evidence dealing with claims of Iranian or Iranian proxy involvement. Nevertheless, according to Iranian reports, February 14 Youth Coalition representatives have thanked Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei for his comments supportive of their activities. Iranian media has also expressed their support for the “revolutionary activities” of the Bahraini group. Despite these pronouncements, the actual relationship between Iran and the February 14 Youth Coalition, particularly dealing with any attempts at training or equipping militant elements attached to the organization, is still unknown.

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Figure 2: Both the February 14 Youth Coalition and Saraya al-Muqawama al-Sha’biya’s logos on a promotional image released onto multiple February 14 Youth Coalition pages.

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Figure 3: SMS supporters carry the group’s flag during a march.

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Figure 4: SMS and February 14 Youth Coalition supporters march together and carry February 14 Youth Coalition flags.

Initially, the February 14 Youth Coalition did not embrace violence. However, after publishing a series of “warnings” to the Bahraini government, Gulf Arab states (namely, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) which have deployed forces to Bahrain, and foreigners recruited into the Bahrain’s internal security forces (often referred to by the group and other Bahraini militants as, “mercenaries”), the coalition issued communiques demonstrating they would choose a more militant path of “resistance.” In a January 27, 2012 English-language statement made by a February 14 Youth Coalition affiliated page, the group issued a statement reading:

“We have so far preserved our right to use force for self-defense, hoping that would make you hesitant from attacking peaceful protestors, women and children. However, common sense and human logic do not seem to work on you…Our people have decided to bring an end to the illegitimate regime…We shall take no responsibility for whatever might happen to the mercenaries after this final warning.”

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Three months after this announcement, SMS pushed for a response to the holding of the controversial 2012 Bahrain Grand Prix Formula 1 race. The group released images urging protestors to throw the gas (the group claimed it was poisonous) used by Bahraini police at the race cars. However, no armed action was taken against the race by SMS. It is likely that in such an early stage of development and combined with Bahraini government crackdowns, the group was unable to act.

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Figure 5: One of SMS’s English language posters calling for action against the 2012 Grand Prix race.

Narrative Structure

SMS considers its fighters to be “jihadists,” refer to their attacks as “jihadist operations,” and believe they are fighting a “jihad against the infidel Khalifas [Bahrain’s ruling royal family].” While the message of jihad is repeated in many SMS statements, these statements do not share the same level of more complicated religious and ideological messaging found with other non-Bahraini Shia jihadist elements.

SMS also lacks a specific goal for what type of government will rule in Bahrain following a theoretical collapse of the currently ruling Khalifa royal family. Still, this has not stopped the group from constructing complex narratives via militant activity for their enemies.

Following Saraya al-Ashtar’s and SMS’s claim of responsibility for the March 3, 2014 bombing (which killed two Bahraini police officers and a police officer sent by the United Arab Emirates [UAE] to Bahrain), SMS used the opportunity to criticize government claims that forces of the Peninsula Shield Force were being used in conjunction with local Bahraini police forces to counter protests and riots.

Sent to Bahrain in 2011, the Peninsula Shield Force included hundreds from the Saudi military and the UAE’s police force. Officially, these units claimed they were not involved in internal matters in Bahrain and were only interested in securing strategic bases and locations from “external influence.” Regardless, the death of a UAE police officer attached to Bahraini police served as a propaganda coup for SMS.

The timing of the SMS’s bombing claim and messages which proceeded it also fit into a broader message dealing with the Peninsula Shield Force and particularly Saudi Arabia. SMS has demonstrated a specific ire for the Saudis. The organization’s communiques have called Saudi Arabia the “usurper of land,” “occupiers,” and have stated their operations are to “purge the land of its Saudi and Khalifa occupiers.”

In part, this may tie back to February 14 Youth Coalition links to Saudi Shia activists. Researcher Fredric M. Wehrey noted that an “important attribute of the February 14 Youth Coalition is its strong affinity with Shi’a activists in neighboring Saudi Arabia.” Wehrey went on to explain how coordinated protests were conducted by Bahraini and Saudi groups out of solidarity. The February 14 Youth Coalition’s and SMS’s links to the Saudi Shia is also important when viewed in context with announcements by fellow militant organization, Saraya al-Mukhtar. Saraya al-Mukhtar has issued a number of announcements saying they share the cause of the “people of the [Saudi] Eastern Region” –an area heavily populated by Saudi Shia. The shared narrative may demonstrate deeper links between Saraya al-Mukhtar, SMS, and the February 14 Youth Coalition.

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Figure 6: A poster released by the February 14 Youth Coalition asking, “Who are the terrorists?” The photo shows Saudi forces crossing the King Fahd Causeway which links Bahrain to Saudi Arabia.  

As part of the view casting the Saudis as foreign occupiers, activists from SMS and the February 14 Youth Coalition have drawn parallels between Israel and Saudi Arabia; accusing both counties of using the same techniques of occupation. Prior to a series of March 2014 protests against “Saudi occupation”, the February 14 Youth Coalition and SMS circulated images attempting to link Saudi Arabia and Israel as fellow occupying states. This also extended into the realm of February 14 Youth Coalition partisans attempting to directly link the causes of Palestinian and Bahraini demonstrators.

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Figure 7: The Israeli flag flies behind Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock (left) while a bulldozer is shown destroying the 400 year old Amir Mohammed Braighi Mosque with a Saudi flag behind it (right). The latter incident occurred in 2011 along with the Bahraini government destruction of other Shia mosques. This picture was used as a tool to organize activists for protests and events against the “Saudi occupation.”

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Figure 8: A poster showing a Bahraini protester (with February 14 Youth Coalition) and a Palestinian activist. The former looks to the now demolished Pearl Roundabout statue, the latter looks to the Dome of the Rock. The picture attempts to show a unity of purpose and cause between Palestinian and Bahraini demonstrators.

Symbols of the “Popular Resistance”

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Figure 9: SMS protesters at a February 14 Youth Coalition event demonstrating against “The Saudi Occupation.”

Shia symbolism is heavily featured in the group’s logo.  The most prominent image is the symbolic hand of Shia leader Abbas Ibn Ali; son of the first Shia imam and loyal aid and military leader for the third Shia imam, Husayn ibn Ali. Serving as Husayn’s flag bearer during the historic Battle of Karbala, Abbas’s hand was cut off by one of the forces of Yazid, the reviled leader of the Umayyads, as Abbas went alone to collect water for Husayn’s dehydrated camp. Abbas went on to fight singlehandedly until his other arm was cut off by sword strikes from Yazid’s forces and was then killed. Abbas’s loyalty and steadfastness until being cut down remains an important message for many Shia Muslims.

Another unique feature from the logo is that “The Sacred Defense” is written within the symbolic hand of Abbas. This helps convey that the group’s conflict with the government is viewed as both a defensive and religiously justified action. Intriguingly, the Shia jihad in Syria and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) have (by Shia actors) both been described as “The Sacred Defense.”

Behind the hand of Abbas are two crossed swords. In posts published by SMS and their supporters, these swords are often called “sword[s] of pride.” This could be a further symbolic message claiming to show SMS as reclaiming perceived lost dignity by anti-government Bahraini protest and militant elements.

In addition to the group’s logo, symbolic forms of dress are also used by SMS to portray their militant bent. As with many militant groups (in the Middle East and abroad), supporters of the organization dress in balaclavas, uniquely made shirts featuring the SMS logo, and often don headbands featuring religious and other types of slogans. The group’s partisans have also worn white burial shrouds during protests and lower-level attacks (using firebombs), symbolizing their willingness to be martyred.

Improvised Weapons & Many Targets

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Figure 10: An SMS photo from December 2013 claiming to show an attack against a power station.

It is no secret that groups such as Saraya al-Mukhtar and Saraya al-Ashtar have utilized improvised weapons. Yet, as an organization, SMS has not shied away from showcasing its improvisational abilities.

One of the more intriguing attempts to cause disruption within the kingdom involved the launching of small balloons around Bahrain International Airport. The balloon launches started in February 2013 with the hope that air traffic into Bahrain could be halted.  SMS also made sure to photograph and publicize their operation. In a February 15, 2013 announcement, the group stated its goal was to, “paralyze the airport and [gain] full vengeance for the martyrs [of the Bahraini Revolution].” These types of operations continued until mid-April, 2013 and were limited in their success.

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Figure 11: An SMS posted photo of one of the balloons they launched near Bahrain International Airport.

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Figure 12: SMS’s March 12, 2013 announcement calling for airliners not to land at Bahrain International Airport. The notice was published in Arabic and English.

Along with their use of more unique platforms to disrupt infrastructure, SMS has also used improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Their first operation involving explosives took place in August 2012 when SMS planted two “grenades” in the food court of a Bahraini mall. The group issued a communique warning those in the mall to leave. In mid-February 2013, the group targeted the National Bank of Bahrain in Sanad. Reportedly, the bomb exploded at night. As with the 2012 announcement that the group had placed explosives in a mall, it would appear the bank attack was less geared toward causing causalities. Instead, both operations were carried out to demonstrate the group’s capabilities and reach.

Security forces and structures the group claims to be linked to internal security forces have also been high on the SMS target list. In December 2013, the SMS claimed to have attacked a power station which gave energy to “military headquarters…[and] supplies centers of torture.” Also starting in December 2013, SMS also claimed to have planted car bombs in the Bahraini capital of Manama. According to the group, the first attacks were orchestrated to show the government’s weak security abilities in key areas. The group also claimed to have planted other car bombs on January 5 and February 13, 2014 (in the latter attack, internal security forces were attacked).

While the attacks did not result in deaths, the targeting of the airport, a bank, certain neighborhoods, and a mall food court demonstrate the group views that civilian sites are viewed as legitimate targets. In terms of rhetorical structure, SMS has also claimed that these targets were legitimate due to their links to the state. Albeit, it would appear the main thrust of SMS operations target internal security apparatuses and that the group is less inclined to hope for civilian casualties.

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Figure 13: SMS’s Facebook claim stating they had planted two IEDs/grenades at a Bahraini mall.

Despite the fact SMS has not explicitly criticized the United States, on June 29, 2013, the organization claimed to have planted and detonated an IED near the U.S. naval base in Juffair, a section of Manama. This operation appears to have coincided with other protests in the area. The purpose behind the bomb was not explicitly released on pages run by the group. However, it is possible SMS may have been trying to send the U.S. a message about the presence of the Fifth Fleet based in Bahrain and the American alliance with the Bahraini government.

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Figure 14: SMS’s claim of blowing-up an IED near an American base.

al-Awzā’ī Foundation for Media Production presents a new statement from the ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzām Brigades: “On the Raid of the Iranian Cultural Center in Beirut”

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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzām Brigades — “On the Raid of the Iranian Cultural Center in Beirut”

_____________

Source: http://justpaste.it/bayanmstsh

To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: azelin@jihadology.net

Hizballah Cavalcade: Saraya al-Mukhtar: A Bahraini Militant Group with Regional Goals

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

Saraya al-Mukhtar: A Bahraini Militant Group with Regional Goals

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Figure 1: Saraya al-Mukhtar’s newest logo. The group’s name is on the bottom, a black zulfiqar style sword combines in with a a black roundel featuring a green fist and black barrel and forearm of a Kalashnikov-type rifle. On the left is a red map of Bahrain.

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Figure 2: Saraya al-Mukhtar’s first logo. The symbol appears to show two crossed bifurcated Zufiqar-type swords resting on a book (most likely the Quran). The organization’s name appears at the bottom of the logo.

First announcing itself to larger audiences online in a September 26, 2013 statement on Facebook (albeit, the statement itself was dated September 27), Saraya al-Mukhtar (The Mukhtar Brigade or SaM) has claimed numerous attacks on Bahraini security forces and has developed a sophisticated messaging strategy. At the time, the then new group promised to strike at the ruling Khalifa royal family and their security forces with, “operations of quality”. Despite the group’s September online appearance, it still claimed attacks since the summer of 2013. These operations have primarily included the use of crudely produced improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and types of arson attacks. SaM also has the unique distinction among Bahraini militant groups for claiming their first fallen member, or “martyr”, Ali al-Sayyid Ahmed al-Musawi. The group’s narrative on both a regional and potential religious-ideological level have also set it aside from other Bahraini armed organizations.

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Figure 3: Saraya al-Mukhtar’s martyrdom poster for Ali Sayyid Ahmed al-Musawi.

Save for the occasional mentions state-run Bahraini press organs and opposition reports on the situation in Bahrain, for the most part, the group has not received as much media scrutiny as militant groups such as Saraya al-Ashtar. Additionally, SaM appears to have escaped specific mention on Bahrain’s terror group list.[1]

The group calls their foes; The Khalifa royal family, Bahraini security forces, and Saudi Arabia, “a mafia/the Khalifa mafia”, “mercenaries/criminals”, and “occupiers”, respectively. In a November 3, 2013 announcement, SaM vowed to “crush the fascistic regime.” This type of discourse generally fits with most rhetoric issued by Bahraini militant groups. Though, SaM appears to be a bit more colorful when describing their enemies.

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Figure 4: SaM’s November 3, 2013 statement.

In terms of promoting the group’s goals, narrative, and attacks, Saraya al-Mukhtar has exhibited the most advanced strategy and online presence when compared to other Bahraini militant organizations. The group has Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram accounts, among other modes of digital communication with supporters. On March 5, 2014, the group’s main Facebook was taken offline. Another page was quickly made in its place where the group claimed “the tyrant’s mercenaries” took the last page down. On YouTube, the group (or possibly loosely-linked supporters) started separate accounts which would upload one clip of an attack the group claimed and then become inactive. It is unclear whether this is done as an operational security method or for some other purpose. As with Saraya al-Ashtar, the group has also sent footage of its attacks to popular pro-revolution YouTube stations for broader dissemination.

Shia religiously-based rhetoric is a more established common feature in SaM’s releases, rhetoric and even the group’s name. The organization also calls itself, “Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya al-Bahrania” or the “Bahraini Islamic Resistance.” Most Iranian-backed militant organizations also use this term as a self-descriptor.[2] However, it is possible this could be an example of mimicry, demonstrating the group respects the strength of those organizations and is attempting to adopt their rhetoric to appear more powerful.

Saraya al-Mukhtar’s moniker is likely a reference to Mukhtar al-Thaqafi. Mukhtar al-Thaqafi was a figure who launched a failed rebellion against the Umayyad’s in the 7th century. The rebellion was initiated in southern Iraq and executed in order to get revenge for the death of the third Shia imam, Husayn ibn Ali, who was killed by the Umayyads during the Battle of Karbala.[3]

Interestingly, the name of the group and its background history plays into the style of media campaigns and announcements made by SaM. Often, the group brands their attacks and those launched by other groups against internal security elements as “revenge.” On January 27, 2014 SaM launched the “Vengeance Has Been Achieved Media Campaign.” Until the time of this writing, the slogan, “Vengeance has been achieved” is still stamped onto the photos of injured (often in hospital) Bahraini police.

The recruitment and naturalization of foreigners (particularly from Sunni Muslim religious backgrounds) into Bahrain’s internal security forces has been a main objection for peaceful protesters and militants alike. This is a main reason why SaM, other Bahraini militants, and peaceful protesters have referred to these internal security elements as “mercenaries.” Tapping into this grievance, SaM regularly posts images of police officers with foreign backgrounds that the group has targeted.

Additionally, the motive of “revenge” may be another attempt to appeal to some younger portions of the protest movement. Due to numerous bloody crackdowns by the government, these elements have become fed-up with more traditional groups leading peaceful protests.[4] Thus, SaM likely sees them as a component which can be brought into to give some level of support (even passive) to the organization’s activities.

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Figure 5: On February 9, 2014, SaM claimed to kill Ahmed Rashid al-Moraysi, a Syrian working for the Bahraini police. “Vengence has been achieved” was stamped on the photo.

Claimed Militant Activities

Saraya al-Mukhtar has been quite prolific in the production of videos and the release of photographs to show off its attacks. In one November, 2013 attack on what the group claimed was a communications network station, photos and a video of the target being attacked (with what appears to be a crude incendiary device) were posted online.

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Following Saraya al-Ashtar’s claimed March 3 bomb attack against Bahraini police, Saraya al-Mukhtar praised the, “Bahraini Resistance.” On March 5 SaM released an edited photo showing the aftermath of the bombing and praising the action.

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Figure 6: Saraya al-Mukhtar’s image praising the bomb attack on March 3, 2014.

The group also claims to be in possession of a special sniper weapon they call the “Mukhtar 1”. It is unclear if the weapon is a firearm or some other improvised device. However, SaM has released video on March 4, 2014 of the Mukhtar 1 in use against Bahraini police forces. Like Saraya al-Ashtar, SaM’s videos were released through a combination of the group’s own YouTube pages.

Another uploaded Saraya al-Mukhtar video claimed to show a January IED attack against a Bahraini police checkpoint. This video was also sent into other YouTube stations in a possible effort to increase viewership.

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Figure 7: A Saraya al-Mukhtar released photo claiming a January attack against “mercenaries”.

Regional Outlook & Ideology

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Figure 8: Saraya al-Mukhtar’s February 20, 2014 post.

Saraya al-Mukhtar’s potential links with radical Shia Islamist ideology and the group’s regional aspirations were showcased in a small post made on their official Facebook page on February 20, 2014. The group appears to view the conflict in Bahrain as part of a larger regional conflagration involving Saudi Arabia. Their post read, “The cause of the people in the Eastern Region [of Saudi Arabia] and our defense is one…Resistance against Saudi occupation, our taklif, and our fate are united.”

The statement about Saudi Arabia’s “Eastern Region” is a direct reference to an area which not only borders Bahrain, but is main zone where much of the Saudi Shia Islamic community, 15 percent of the Saudi population, call home.[5] Saudi Shia have faced exclusion from politics, government positions, and many economic opportunities, not to mention suffering religious discrimination. Throughout 2013, Saudi Shia groups organized numerous protests—particularly in Qatif, a seaside town which is about an hour’s drive from the Bahraini capital, Manamah.[6] According to Hossein Askari, “Historically, Sunni-Shia dynamics in Saudi Arabia have been affected significantly by events in neighboring Bahrain.”[7] Many of these protests were carried out in response to Saudi Arabia’s 2011 deployment of forces to Bahrain as part of the so-called Peninsula Shield Force.

Besides talk of also battling the Saudis, there was mention of a “taklif”. A taklif, or a legalistic religious order, is a concept widely used by Iranian-backed organizations and clerics as part of their Absolute Wilayat al-Faqih ideology. A taklif must be followed, since it is viewed as an order coming directly from God.[8] Traditionally, Shia Islamic circles did not use taklif in a political manner. Even radical Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, who had close ties to Lebanese Hizballah (which follows the Wilayat al-Faqih ideology), came out against the practice in that politicized form.[9] Nevertheless, adherents to Wilayat al-Faqih often obey issued taklifs in matters ranging from voting to the engagement in warfare.

Nevertheless, it is important to remember that this is just one post online and the mention of a taklif must be viewed in a broader context. Thus far, SaM has not issued any statements in support of Khomeinist ideology or Iran. Furthermore, the organization appears to use Shia symbolism and rhetoric (e.g. support for Shia in Saudi Arabia), yet has not produced any real ideological demands or plans for a post-Khalifa Bahrain. At this point, the group appears to be more interested in militant activities.


[1] See: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/04/us-bahrain-unrest-idUSBREA231FC20140304. Note: Bahrain’s recent terror listings have stated (in one instance) that any group affiliated with Saraya al-Ashtar would be considered a terror group. Considering SaM has praised attacks claimed by Saraya al-Ashtar, it’s likely they have found a place on the list in a more de facto fashion.

[2] E.G. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq which calls itself “Al Muqawama al-Islamiyya fi Iraq” (The Islamic Resistance in Iraq) or Lebanese Hizballah which goes by “Al Muqawama al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan” (The Islamic Resistance in Lebanon).

[7] Hossein Askari, Conflicts in the Persian Gulf: Origins and Evolution, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), P. 41

Hizballah Cavalcade: Saraya al-Ashtar: Bahrain’s Illusive Bomb Throwers

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here. For the first part in the subseries on Bahraini militant groups: “The Pearl and the Molotov.”

Saraya al-Ashtar: Bahrain’s Illusive Bomb Throwers

by Phillip Smyth

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Figure 1: Saraya al-Ashtar’s main logo. The symbol shows two Kalashnikov-type rifles crossed over a roundel which resembles a pearl. The base includes the group’s name.

“The operation comes in revenge for our martyrs”, read the March 3, 2014 “Statement No. 9”, issued by Saraya al-Ashtar (The Ashtar Brigades or SaA) on Facebook and Twitter. This declaration directly referred to a bomb which was detonated during a Bahraini police operation in the town of Daih. Three were killed, including an Emirati officer who was deployed to Bahrain as part of the “Gulf Waves Force”.[1] Reportedly, the police were attempting to disperse what was claimed in an official statement as a “riot.” The protests occurred following funeral demos for another Bahraini protester.[2] However, the group claiming responsibly for the bombing received little attention in Western media and passing mention in Arabic language news. Regardless, the Saraya al-Ashtar group is quickly making a name for itself via it bombing campaign.

Since the summer of 2013, the group claimed almost twenty attacks against security personnel in Bahrain. The March 3 blast appears to be another attack in a long and developing list of bombings carried out by the group. This will probably not be the group’s last. On March 4, the Bahraini government listed Saraya al-Ashtar as a terrorist group.[3] Still, the organization is quite shadowy and despite Bahraini government arrests, appears to be active.

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Figure 2: Saraya al-Ashtar’s Statement 9, which claimed responsibility for the bombing of Bahraini police officers.

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Figure 3: A member of the Bahraini internal security forces looks at blood-stained concrete following the March 3rd blast. (Source: Facebook)

Saraya al-Ashtar released its first statement via their Facebook page on April 27, 2013 (albeit, the written statement was dated April 28, 2013). In part, it stated, “Enough is enough” in regard to the actions of, “the rabid dogs of al-Khalifa [Bahrain’s ruling royal family].” The group promised to strike their enemies the next day.  Keeping to their word, on April 29 SaA claimed in another post that they had, “Targeted a collection of mercenaries [the term most Bahraini militants use to describe Bahraini internal security forces] at the Adra roundabout”.[4]

Attacks such as these have demonstrated SaA’s preferred method of operation: Building and detonating improvised explosive devices and their direct targeting of Bahraini government security personnel.

SaA has an extensive social media presence with Facebook and Twitter accounts. These platforms are used to promote the group, broadcast threats, and to claim responsibility for attacks. Nevertheless, the group has not posted any photographs of their operations, membership, or weapons systems.

In fact, SaA has not released any photographs save for their logos. With the logos come further questions. SaA’s first displayed symbol was clearly modeled off of Iranian-backed groups, most likely Kata’ib Hizballah’s logo.  Their second, showing crossed Kalashnikovs over what appears to be a pearl (a national symbol for Bahrain) continues the militant theme.

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Figure 4: SaA’s first logo.

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Figure 5: Kata’ib Hizballah’s logo. Note the similarities between the fist-clenching-Kalashnikov images.

While photographs have been lacking, there have been a number of videos released onto the internet showing SaA’s attacks. Since the summer of 2013 the group has also posted video footage of some of the attacks it has carried out against Bahraini security personnel. One of the videos claimed to show an attack the group made in Bani Jamra, a town in northwestern Bahrain.[5]  In another video from October, the group wrote, “This is just the beginning.”

Designed to coincide with the major February 14 protests (which commemorate the start of the 2011 Bahraini Uprising), SaA carried out another nighttime attack against Bahraini internal security forces and also released a film of their action. Albeit, instead of using their own accounts, this time the group sent the video to the popular “Revolution Bahrain” YouTube station. This style of release was repeated following the March 3 bombing when the group released footage it claims to have taken showing the aftermath of the bomb. In all cases, films of their attacks are regularly edited in order to give the group a level of operational security.

Following the March 3 blast, supporters of the group published clips which reportedly showed protests in support of the “holy warriors of Saraya al-Ashtar.” During the protest, candy was handed out to show support for the attack.[6]

The Rhetoric of Saraya al-Ashtar

Demonstrating a direct link to the adoption of Shia-centric forms of messaging, Saraya al-Ashtar’s name was likely no coincidence. It’s possible the group draws the roots of its name from Malik al-Ashtar, one of Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib’s most loyal aids and colleagues. Malik al-Ashtar was also known to be a brave warrior and took part in a number of major battles at the behest of Ali. Ali Ibn Abi Talib, was the Islamic Prophet Muhammad’s relative and viewed by Shia as the Prophet’s successor and the first Imam.

The organization also refers to its combatants as “Rijal Allah” or the “Men of God.” The utilization of the phrase sets the underpinning for a religiously focused message: These fighters are doing the work of God. This immediately casts their foes as agents of a notably less than holy origin. The term finds regular use as a descriptor for Lebanese Hizballah and Iraqi Shia Islamist fighters among the supporters and members from Iranian-backed proxy organizations currently fighting in Syria.

Nevertheless, it is still essential to acknowledge that despite the organization’s clear Shia-centric messaging, it has attempted to argue that it is not a sectarian entity. In Saraya al-Ashtar’s July “Statement No.4”, the group accused the government of “igniting sectarian strife between the communities.” SaA also claimed that, “all of [Saraya al-Ashtar’s] operations are directed at the pillars of the corrupt regime and its mercenaries.”

There are a few ways to measure such a statement. When compared to the bulk of Iranian-backed Shia Islamist group rhetoric, those organizations also claim to be non-sectarian while simultaneously promoting an undercurrent of heavy Shia-centric sectarian messaging. There is also the possibility the group is honestly conveying its “revolutionary” beliefs. Arguing that its enemy is not Sunni Muslims, just the government under the Khalifa royal family and their supporting elements, is given more weight considering the group has only directly targeted security personnel.

As with other Bahraini militant groups, Bahrain’s security personnel are regularly referred to as “mercenaries.” The charge that Bahraini security forces are “mercenaries” stems from Bahraini recruitment of outsiders, primarily Sunnis from Pakistan and other Arab states. Additionally, while the organization has not specifically called-out Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states which sent forces to Bahrain in 2011, it does make passing references to their presence as, “the occupation.” In an effort to demonstrate the weakness of the Khalifa royal family, the SaA regularly refers to the Bahraini royals as a “collapsing regime”.

Saraya al-Ashtar’s Messaging & Links to Iran

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Figure 6: Saraya al-Ashtar’s Statement No. 4.

At the time this post was written the group had released nine statements dealing primarily with their militant activity.  Besides claiming responsibility for bomb attacks, another main focal point for SaA’s releases have dealt with the fate of political prisoners and to show support for main figures involved with the protests The condition of Abdulwahab Husayn Ali Ahmed Isma’il (A.K.A. Abdulwahab Husayn), a major ideologue, politician, and protest leader since the uprisings in Bahrain in the 1990s, was a core concern in SaA’s 2nd (May 17, 2013) and 8th (November 10, 2013) released statements. At the start of the 2011 Bahrain protests, Husayn was arrested by Bahraini authorities, reportedly tortured, and then sentenced to life in prison by a military court. Even though the sentence was overturned, Husayn remained in prison. In both statements, concerns over Husayn’s “deteriorating health” were main themes. The statement in November also reflected broader protest groups’ concerns over Husayn’s health and accused the Bahraini government of abusing him.[7]

When the home of Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Ahmed Qassim’s home was raided by Bahraini authorities, in May 2013, SaA described it as a “[criminal] act”. Iran and Lebanese Hizballah also condemned the raid.[8] Qassim is the leading Shia cleric in Bahrain and is considered a “spiritual leader” for the opposition Al-Wefaq Party. Pro-government activists and figures have accused Qassim of instigating violence against police forces in Bahrain.[9]

A July 2012 paper by the American Enterprise Institute noted Qassim was increasingly moving into Iran’s orbit and this, “should be a red flag for the US on Bahrain.”[10] It is also important to note that Qassim did his religious studies in Qum, Iran. Qum is a center for the promotion of Absolute Wilayat al-Faqih, the main Iranian Islamic Revolutionary ideological concept. While there, he studied under Grand Ayatollah Kazim al-Haeri, the same figure who issued the first publicly available fatwa declaring Shia should fight a jihad in Syria. (in addition to other clerics). In the 1960s, when Qassim studied in Najaf, Iraq it was claimed by Iranian sources he was a student of the late radical cleric Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.[11]

In one article by Al-Arabiya, it was claimed that Saraya al-Ashtar is loyal to the concept of Absolute Wilayat al-Faqih.[12] However, the SaA has not published anything which publically confirms their reported faithfulness to the religious-political ideology.

Still, Bahraini and Emirati authorities have accused the group of receiving direct assistance from Iran and Lebanese Hizballah. Dubai’s police chief claimed that one of the people who planted the March 3 bomb, which killed an Emirati police officer, was trained by Hizballah after a trip to Lebanon.[13]

While links to Iran are hazy, the increasing activities of the group, sophistication in terms of building and placing bombs, and frequency of attacks, does beg the question: Where did Saraya al-Ashtar’s bomb makers and operatives learn their deadly skills? As demonstrated by the growth of Iranian-backed Shia Islamist militias in Syria, Iranian presence is often a well-hidden element. In Bahrain, where there are regular accusations of Iranian intervention, it is likely that if Iran did have a hand in constructing Saraya al-Ashtar, it has done its best to obscure this involvement. However, based on open source information it is still too hard to confirm or fully deny Iranian connections to the group.


[1] See: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26421744. It’s important to note that some reported the killed police officers were originally from foreign states. Foreigners who joined internal security forces and were then naturalized has been a major issue for protesters and militants alike. Additionally, forces attached to the initial 2011 deployment of primarily Saudi and Emirati forces (the latter deployed 500 police officers) have also provoked the ire of protesters and militants. Two of those killed in the attack were foreign born: Muhammad Arslan was a Pakistani and Tariq Al-Shahi was from the UAE and part of the “Gulf Waves Force” which sent police from the UAE to Bahrain. It’s also important to mention that both the Saudi and UAE forces have denied direct involvement in Bahraini affairs. See also: http://www.thenational.ae/world/emirati-officer-dies-in-bahrain-bomb-explosion.

[2] Note: According to family members, the protester died due to being tortured. The Bahraini government denied this charge.

[4] AFP also reported the attack, but no organization was named as responsible. See: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Apr/29/bomb-explodes-after-bahrain-detains-22-over-unrest-22.asp.

[5] This attack was also covered by Bahraini state media. The state media station intimated connections between the bombers and support for the late Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and the February 14 Youth Coalition. The February 14 Youth Coalition has been a leading group in organizing protests. See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GIAeVW3SyWo

[6] For an excellent post which also utilizes this video footage, see: http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.com/2014/03/tit-for-tat-in-bahrain.html.

Hizballah Cavalcade: The Pearl & the Molotov: Bahrain’s Growing Militant Groups

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

The Pearl & the Molotov: Bahrain’s Growing Militant Groups

By Phillip Smyth

Untitled518

Figure 1: In a nighttime demonstration, members of Sariyya al-Muqawama al-Sha’bia (The Brigades of Popular Resistance) march wearing balaclavas and white burial shrouds. The shrouds exhibit their willingness to be martyred.

While a Shia jihad is being fought in Syria, Bahrain stands as another central conflict which continues to influence discourse, regional policies, and exacerbate sectarian tensions. For many Shia Islamists, particularly militant groups backed by Iran, Bahrain is a major political sore spot and focal point. Over the course of three years, the development of new militant groups within Bahrain has demonstrated that there is an increasing utilization of violent tactics. Since these militant groups are in the more rudimentary stages of development, there is the further possibility that they are increasingly viewing the conflict in Bahrain along regional and sectarian lines.

Main Goals of Hizballah Cavalcade’s Bahrain Posts

Since violent Bahraini organizations have not received adequate profiling, it is the goal of Hizballah Cavalcade to clarify their positions using primary open source material. Thus main goals include, but are not limited to:

  • Describing the established organizations, their claims, goals, and ideological orientations.
  • Analyzing claims made by the groups.
  • Attempting to establish whether the organizations in question may have a connection to external actors.

A Little Background

Since 2011, Shia-majority Bahrain, which is led by the Sunni Khalifa royal family, has been gripped by protests calling for (among other demands) the Khalifas to abdicate, democratic reforms, and greater access for Shia to government positions.[1] For the most part, protests have been peaceful and have at times included both Sunni and Shia Muslims. These protesters have been faced with a number of often violent government crackdowns and accusations of the use torture by authorities.[2]

Yet, the protests, deaths, and growing polarization in Bahrain has regularly been considered a sort of sideshow when compared to other major protests and civil wars in the Middle East. The BBC even referred to the protests as the, “Forgotten Spring.”[3] Still, it would appear that some within the protest movement and possibly external organizations, are bent on forming groups to achieve their ends via violence.

On February 14, 2014—to commemorate the first “Day of Rage” held by Bahraini protesters on the same day in 2011—massive protests, which included main opposition parties and independent groups were held throughout the country. For the most part, these protests were peaceful.  Around this time Bahraini authorities also reported a “terror blast.”[4] While this was hardly the first act of violence by a group within Bahrain, the blast underlined a number of more violent actions carried out by new organizations, since 2012.

In December of that year, Reese Erlich of the Global Post noted that younger elements of the protest movement were increasingly turning to violence and were making it difficult for local traditional leaders to control their activities.[5] By the end of 2013, new armed organizations calling for the overthrow of the Bahraini government were announced and continue to claim new attacks within Bahrain. In a period stretching from September 2013-January 2014, most of these new groups adopted higher profiles and attempted to brand their narratives, claimed attacks, and group identities within their online communities and pages.

Understanding Bahraini Militant Rhetoric

Bahraini militant organizations utilize rhetorical phrases and terms found with other Shia Islamist militant groups operating in Syria and Iraq. Often, their enemies are referred to as, “the Khalifa mafia”, “mercenaries” or “Saudi agents”. Nevertheless, this type of rhetoric also draws heavily upon local issues.

There were reports as early as 2011 that Bahrain was recruiting Sunni foreigners to man the internal security apparatus.[6] This issue of naturalizing foreign Sunnis, particularly from Pakistan, is viewed by protest leaders and militants alike as a major sectarian, economic, and social issue.[7] As future posts will show, the utilization of foreign-born police and security personnel is showcased in Bahraini militant propaganda.

Additionally, Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf Arab states sent forces as part of the Peninsula Shield which sent troops to Bahrain in March 2011. In April 2013, Peninsula Shield established a further headquarters in Bahrain in order to better coordinate their forces in the country.[8] Bahraini outlets have also reported that as of January 2014 these military forces were still defending “key instillations” and claimed they were not involved in Bahrain’s “internal issues.”[9] The presence of Saudi forces has added to the charge by protesters and militants that the Khalifas are simply propped-up by outside forces. An underlying message, which combines both national and religious identity, is that outside Sunnis (namely those who subscribe to Wahhabism; A religious movement which at times has demonstrated a violent hatred for Shi’ism) are continuing to control what should be Bahraini Shia affairs.

At the time of this writing, none of the groups have overtly stated that their goals are directly related to Shi’ism. However, many of the organizations use Shia-centric imagery, and have almost exclusively Shia members. Moreover, a number of the organizations in question have adopted the moniker, “Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya” (“The Islamic Resistance”), a term heavily utilized and favored by Iranian-backed organizations, particularly Lebanese Hizballah and Iraq’s Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.

What About Iran?

Bahraini authorities have regularly accused Iran of being a main driver behind the protests and in violent acts executed against security forces in the country.[10] As documented in other Hizballah Cavalcade posts, Iran makes no secret about its support for Shia jihadis in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. In fact, Iran has been a vocal supporter of the Bahraini protesters. In commemoration of 120 protesters killed in Bahrain, Iran opened a memorial for the “martyrs of the Islamic Revolution” in Tehran.[11]

In May 2013 Bahraini authorities banned political organizations within the country from contacting Lebanese Hizballah.[12] Later in December, Lebanese Hizballah’s Al-Manar TV station apologized for their coverage of events in Bahrain.[13] Shia Islamists in Iraq have also launched protests and issued very public criticisms of the situation in Bahrain. Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr has also been active in voicing his concern and support for Bahraini Shia protesters.[14]

Of course, Bahrain is not Syria and any claimed “jihad” would be hamstrung by the fact that Bahrain has strict gun control laws.[15] Smuggling of arms is also complicated by the presence of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet (which is based in Bahrain) and by Bahraini units. As a result, many attacks have not used firearms, but instead utilize Molotov cocktails, hand grenades, homemade bombs, and other improvised weapons. In December 2013, Bahraini authorities claimed to intercept a shipment of “Iranian-made” explosives and other arms.[16]

Despite the many claims of Iranian involvement, there have been strong denials regarding the “Iranian hand” since the start of the protests.[17] Available information on armed organizations and their links to Iran is sparse and still developing. Additionally, some sympathetic to the protest movement have claimed these organizations are little more than fabrications by the Bahraini authorities. Regardless, this does not necessitate that Iran is not attempting to co-opt some of the more violent elements belonging to the anti-government ranks, create new militant organizations in Bahrain, or extend a more covert hand to those engaged in violence. Forthcoming posts will delve into these specifics in more detail.


[1] Some of their 2011 demands were listed in this Reuters piece: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/15/us-bahrain-protesters-idUSTRE71E3YN20110215.

[10] See: http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/iran-must-stop-meddling-in-our-affairs-bahrain-1.1296492. Most recently, Bahraini authorities have also accused Iran of being behind training and equipping those who carried out bombings in the kingdom. See: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/bahrain-accuses-iran-training-rebels-201413144049814960.html.

[12] See: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/27/us-bahrain-hezbollah-idUSBRE94Q0CR20130527. Bahraini authorities also went so far as to ban books they felt were connected to Lebanese Hizballah (http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/579261) and restrict access to websites affiliated with the group (http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/573944).

[14] Sadr organized rallies in 2011 in Basra and Baghdad. See: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/16/us-bahrain-iraq-idUSTRE72F4U220110316. In 2012 he also demanded the release of a German Shia prisoner jailed by Bahraini authorities http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hdjuVY1N_2x3OsmZC0fOfUmOThbQ?docId=CNG.7e3f91968ac1c442282f98bc759b433d.3f1.

[15] In some cases, possession of illegal firearms could land one in prison for 15 years. See: http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=/data/middleeast/2012/April/middleeast_April100.xml&section=middleeast.

[17] On March 2, 2014 an Iranian parliamentarian denied any interference in Bahraini affairs. See: http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13921211000586.

al-Awzā’ī Foundation for Media Production presents a new video message from the ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzām Brigades: “Adoption of the Battle of the Iranian Cultural Center in Beirut”

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Source: https://twitter.com/azzambrigades_/status/436137909997932545

To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: azelin@jihadology.net

al-Awzā’ī Foundation for Media Production presents a new video message from the ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzām Brigades: “Raid of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut”

vqufk

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Source: twitter.com/azzambrigades_/status/433706720167075841

To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: azelin@jihadology.net

New statement from the ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzām Brigades: “Raid of Bombing the Stronghold of Ḥizb Irān in the Hermel”

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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzām Brigades — “Raid of Bombing the Stronghold of Ḥizb Irān in the Hermel”

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Source: https://alfidaa.info/vb/showthread.php?t=92936

To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: azelin@jihadology.net

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