Check out my new ‘Policy Watch’ for the Washington Institute: “One Year of the Islamic State Worldwide Activity Map”

On March 21, 2023, The Washington Institute launched the Islamic State Select Worldwide Activity Map as a way to better track and understand the global jihadist organization’s status. The ongoing project includes data on IS propaganda, claims of responsibility, financial sanctions, arrests, and other factors, providing a more holistic view of the group than attack data alone.

A year later, the data collectively paints a sobering picture. Although the core IS “provinces” in Iraq and Syria remain degraded, the group has been able to diversify at the periphery, with the Khorasan province in Afghanistan (aka IS-K) spearheading external operations while various other provinces establish territorial control in Africa. IS supporters continue to plot major terrorist attacks as well, especially in Turkey, though most of these have been thwarted by law enforcement (with the notable exception of the January 2024 bombings in Kerman, Iran). Given these evolving threats, it is worthwhile to explore the findings of the IS Activity Map project in greater detail, since they can provide a clearer picture of where the organization stands today amid growing calls to dissolve the global coalition tasked with fighting IS.

Click here to read the rest.

Check out my new ‘Policy Watch’ for the Washington Institute: “ISKP Goes Global: External Operations from Afghanistan”

Over the past three decades, successive jihadist organizations have sought to conduct external operations beyond their local battlefields, often from safe havens abroad. The long list includes actors such as the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (when it hijacked Air France Flight 8969 in 1994), al-Qaeda (most infamously via the 9/11 attacks, but also through plots by local branches al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Shabab, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), and the Islamic State (e.g., in Syria and Libya).

Today, the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISKP) has adopted the same strategy in Afghanistan. Yet unlike many previous groups that relied on stable safe havens to gain more time and space for planning and training, ISKP has actually grown weaker in Afghanistan during the Taliban’s second year in power—while paradoxically expanding its external operations capacity. On the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the situation is a stark reminder that Afghanistan under the Taliban is a top vector for jihadist operations abroad.

Click here to read the rest.

GUEST POST: al-Zawahiri’s Line of Succession

As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this websites administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Jihadology aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy researchers to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.

Click here to see an archive of all guest posts.

al-Zawahiri’s Line of Succession

By Kévin Jackson

When a U.S. drone strike killed Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul almost a year ago, al-Qaida was left yet again to find a new emir, eleven years after the death of its founding leader Usama bin Ladin. Al-Zawahiri had long prepared his organization for this moment though. Back in late November-December 2013, he had sent a missive to Jabhat al-Nusra, then al-Qaida’s Syrian affiliate, conveying that “he would be absent for a time from contact for his security circumstances.” In this message, the Egyptian, anticipating his prolonged absence, devised a formal chain of succession in the event of his demise to prevent a void in al-Qaida’s leadership.

Though dated, al-Zawahiri’s succession plan is still the best primary document to study when reflecting on the outlook of al-Qaida’s leadership as it offers invaluable insight into the mindset of the late emir of al-Qaida regarding his replacement. This transitional period appears especially challenging for al-Qaida. After Bin Ladin’s killing, there was no question that al-Zawahiri was his legitimate heir, whereas today the group does not have such an obvious candidate. Further, public calls to “dissolve al-Qaida” have multiplied within the militant milieu over the past few years, therefore making al-Zawahiri’s replacement even more critical to the Central organization in its quest to keep its affiliates’ loyalty and maintain its global reach.

al-Zawahiri’s Chosen Ones

When he outlined how al-Qaida should handle his demise in 2013, al-Zawahiri had no less than four names in mind for his succession, which he ranked as follows: Abu al-Khayr al-Misri; Abu Muhammad al-Misri; Sayf al-Adl; and Nasir al-Wuhayshi. His first three choices were all fellow Egyptians with a decades-long history in jihad, which stretched back to Afghanistan in the 1980s. A member of al-Qaida’s Shura Council since 2001, Abu al-Khayr had previously acted as “the main coordinator” between al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian al-Jihad group and al-Qaida. He had long been highly regarded and trusted by al-Qaida’s leaders, including Bin Ladin, to the point that he was privy to the 9/11 plotting. For their part, Abu Muhammad and al-Adl held leading roles in al-Qaida’s training, military, security, and external operations committees and were serving in al-Qaida’s Shura Council since the early 1990s. Finally, al-Wuhayshi was the then leader of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Although al-Zawahiri’s succession plan seemed very Egyptian-centric, it is worth noting that his hierarchy was no different from Bin Ladin’s. In a letter written in September 2010, the latter stated that “Shaykh Abu al-Khayr and Shaykh Abu Muhammad are above our brother (…) Sayf al-Adl”. The difference with al-Zawahiri was that, while Bin Ladin considered that al-Adl had “efforts that would benefit the jihad and the mujahidin […] in the military work”, he did not see al-Adl fit to become the “general manager” or even the deputy manager of al-Qaida, let alone its emir.  

At the time al-Zawahiri was crafting his short list, his first three choices were detained in Iran. He had thereby to rely on his fourth candidate, al-Wuhayshi. Since then, “all the branches of al-Qaida know that [al-Wuhayshi] was deputy to Shaykh Ayman, and practiced his competencies entirely because of the absence of Shaykh Ayman,” according to al-Nusra. The release of an Iranian diplomat held hostage by AQAP in Yemen in March 2015 came to revitalize al-Qaida’s top leadership. Indeed, in exchange for their diplomat’s release, Tehran freed six senior al-Qaida figures, including al-Zawahiri’s three successors. Following his subsequent relocation to Syria, Abu al-Khayr shared with al-Nusra “a letter making clear through it that [he] was the successor to Shaykh al-Zawahiri.” As for Abu Muhammad and al-Adl, the duo remained in Iran, as they “were barred from departing [the country],” all the while overseeing al-Qaida’s affairs.

Five years later though, al-Zawahiri had lost three of his potential successors: al-Wuhayshi was killed in al-Mukalla, Yemen, on June 12, 2015; Abu al-Khayr was killed in Idlib, Syria, on February 26, 2017; and Abu Muhammad was gunned down in Iran’s capital Tehran on August 7, 2020. Al-Adl is thus the only remaining successor picked by al-Zawahiri back in 2013 and the best positioned to take over, at least on paper. In practice, al-Adl’s ascension appears compromised by al-Qaida’s own protocols, as al-Zawahiri specified that his heir must be “in Khurasan or one of the branches of the group.” Besides, al-Adl’s murky status in Iran has already caused his leadership to be contested internally. In Syria, al-Nusra rebuffed what they viewed as the excessive influence of al-Adl and Abu Muhammad precisely because the duo was “present in an enemy country (Iran),” whereas the “organizational principles for al-Qaida itself stipulate that no one can enjoy competencies so long as he is not in one of the branches.” In the aftermath of al-Zawahiri’s death, it was reported that the potential nomination of al-Adl was facing a “large number of opponents” inside the al-Qaida camp, a defiance mostly motivated by his longstanding presence in Iran, which is viewed as highly suspicious within jihadi circles. 

A few months ago, a report from the U.N. Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team asserted that al-Adl was now “operating as the de facto and uncontested leader of the group.” The aforementioned al-Qa‘ida regulations and criticism about al-‘Adl are no minor hurdles though and should thus warrant caution regarding this claim. Besides, it would not be the first time that he was erroneously labeled as such. Back in 2011, after the death of Bin Ladin, media reports had already claimed that al-‘Adl had been appointed as the new leader of al-Qa‘ida, even though he was then still detained in Iran. The latest U.N.’s report on Afghanistan alleges that al-Adl may have recently relocated to Afghanistan, a development which would significantly help his case. This claim is far from making consensus though. If al-Adl were still in Iran with limited freedom of movement, this would likely be viewed as too problematic by the Central organization for him to be the permanent leader, regardless of his seniority or military acumen.

The Shura Council

Since the death of al-Wuhayshi, Abu al-Khayr and Abu Muhammad between 2015 and 2020, al-Zawahiri has had plenty of time to find new candidates (besides al-Adl) for his replacement. To be sure, operational security has at times hampered al-Zawahiri’s ability to communicate with the outside world. Yet, his private correspondence with his aides, from Syria to Yemen, and his numerous public statements before his killing suggest that his courier network was functional enough for him to relay a new succession plan during that time frame. It is thus doubtful that al-Adl was the only designated successor when al-Zawahiri was killed last year. 

While the latter’s updated short list has been kept secret, it is clear that the members of al-Qaida’s Shura Council will play a pivotal role in this transition. Indeed, the organizational guidelines set up by al-Zawahiri state that if none of his options could take over, then “the brothers in the Shura of the general command are to choose a new amir.” Further, it is most likely within this top al-Qaida’s body that al-Zawahiri took new candidates (besides al-Adl) for his replacement. Here, it is worth remembering that the first three choices of al-Zawahiri for his succession were all part of the Shura, even though their role had long been limited owing to the restrictions they faced in Iran.

Between March and June 2014, each member of al-Qaida’s Shura took an oath to follow al-Zawahiri’s initial succession plan. Today, only two of these six figures appear to be alive: Abd al-Rahman al-Maghribi and Hamza al-Ghamidi.

A former software programming student, al-Maghribi, a Moroccan national, lived in Krefeld, western Germany, before traveling to Afghanistan together with a small group of friends in mid December 1999. Recommended by Karim Mehdi, a German-based Moroccan veteran of al-Qaida’s camps in Afghanistan, al-Maghribi was sent straight to Bin Ladin’s headquarters in Kandahar while his companions were dispatched to a training camp. In Kandahar, al-Maghribi mixed with other jihadis formerly based in Germany, including 9/11 coordinator Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the German convert Christian Ganczarski. Most importantly, al-Maghribi began his longtime career in al-Qaida’s propaganda effort. Described as an “expert in computers” by a close jihadi friend, al-Maghribi was tapped for his background by al-Qaida’s leadership to be part of the group’s media arm al-Sahab, alongside 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), who headed al-Sahab, and 9/11 facilitator Mustafa al-Hawsawi, among others.

Following the arrest of his boss KSM in 2003, al-Maghribi took over al-Sahab and supervised al-Qa

Articles of the Week – 12/11-12/17

Monday December 13:

Threat Perception, Policy Diffusion, and the Logic of Terrorist Group Designation – Mirna El Masri and Brian J. Phillips, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: https://bit.ly/3mbbDVC

Seasoned Skeptics Why Syrian Kurds Have Resisted Political Islam – Sirwan Kajjo and Oula A. Alrifai, Washington Institute for Near East Policy: https://bit.ly/3GPrYay

Tuesday December 14:

Neither Local, Nor Transnational, But Both: The Islamic State in Congo – Ryan O’Farrell, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy: https://bit.ly/3IXdnLY

Thursday December 16:

Moderating Extremism: The State of Online Terrorist Content Removal Policy in the United States – Bennett Clifford, Program on Extremism: https://bit.ly/3q7zqqK

Consolidation of Nonstate Armed Actors in Fragmented Conflicts: Introducing an Emerging Research Program – Mohammed M. Hafez, Michael Gabbay, and Emily Kalah Gade, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: bit.ly/3mxpmqj

Islamic State in Khorasan Province Counters Taliban with Formidable Media and Propaganda Offensive – Riccardo Valle, Terrorism Monitor: https://bit.ly/3IVf0tH

State Accompli: The Political Consolidation of the Islamic State Prior to the Caliphate Nadeem Elias Khan and Craig Whiteside, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: https://bit.ly/3F5JlDD

Articles of the Week – 9/4-9/10

Saturday September 4:

Shining Light on the “Going Dark” Phenomenon: U.S. Efforts to Overcome the Use of End-to-End Encryption by Islamic State Supporters – Ryan Pereira, Harvard National Security Journal: https://bit.ly/2XaRfu4

Sunday September 5:

When Civilians are Targets: The Fatal Effects of State Sponsored Religiously Motivated Terrorism – Brittnee Carter, Democracy and Security: https://bit.ly/3C2D9do

How Are the Taliban Organized? – Abdul Sayed, Voice of America: https://bit.ly/3A0Ar7D

Translating Ideas into Actions: Analyzing Local Strategic Work to Counter Violent Extremism – Robin Andersson Malmros, Democracy and Security: https://bit.ly/3yZTDRR

Tuesday September 7: 

The evolving Taliban-ISK rivalry – Amira Jadoon, Andrew Mines, and Abdul Sayed, The Lowy Institute: https://bit.ly/3C4eFkh

Islamic State in Khorasan Province’s Campaign against Afghan Women – Riccardo Valle, Terrorism Monitor: https://bit.ly/3hnsJ06

Wednesday September 8:

The Terror Threat From Afghanistan Post the Taliban Takeover – Asfandyar Mir, CTC Sentinel: https://bit.ly/3E5sAs4

The Fight for Supremacy in Northwest Syria and the Implications for Global Jihad – Charles Lister, CTC Sentinel: https://bit.ly/38WFF8K

The Jihadi Threat in the Arabian Peninsula – Elisabeth Kendall,  CTC Sentinel: https://bit.ly/3jZEQT1

The Threat in Africa—The New Epicenter of Global Jihadi Terror – Tricia Bacon and Jason Warner, CTC Sentinel: https://bit.ly/3yZTBtc

What Is the Future of the Global Jihadi Movement? – Colin Clarke, CTC Sentinel: https://bit.ly/3C3A9Of

Al-Shabaab’s Assassinations: Investigating the Uniqueness of Al-Shabaab’s Assassinations via Suicide Bombing – Ellen Chapin, Stephanie Lizzo, and Jason Warner, The Journal of the Middle East and Africa: https://bit.ly/3z1oOfm

Thursday September 9:

When Tunisians Fired the Start Gun for 9/11 – Aaron Y. Zelin, Washington Institute for Near East Policy: https://bit.ly/3hEbEPZ

What the Global War on Terror Really Accomplished – Hassan Hassan, Newlines Magazine: https://bit.ly/3k1HwQ6

Jihadism is Spreading to the Gulf of Guinea Littoral States, and a New Approach to Countering It is Needed – Aneliese Bernard, Modern War Institute: https://bit.ly/2YLDsLy

The Islamic State’s expansion into Congo’s Ituri Province – Caleb Weiss, Ryan O’Farrell, Long War Journal: https://bit.ly/3tuWvF6

Remembering the Gains of the Afghanistan War – Daniel Byman and Benjamin Wittes, Lawfare: https://bit.ly/3EfDs6S

Friday September 10:

The Intractability of Islamist Insurgencies: Islamist Rebels and the Recurrence of Civil War – Desirée Nilsson, Isak Svensson, International Studies Quarterly: https://bit.ly/3zh6m2x

Framing Insurgency and the Rebel Proto-State: Al-Shabaab’s Media and Information Operations – Christopher Anzalone, The Journal of the Middle East and Africa: https://bit.ly/3AqA8mX

Gone to Waste: the ‘CVE’ Industry After 9/11 – Lydia Wilson, Newlines Magazine: https://bit.ly/39jNPZ8

The Massoud Assassination and 9/11 – HINDSIGHT IS 20/20: https://bit.ly/3AmPfhj

Articles of the Week – 12/12-12/18

Monday December 14:

Scriptural legitimation and the mobilisation of support for religious violence: experimental evidence across three religions and seven countries – Ruud Koopmans, Eylem Kanol, and Dietlind Stolle, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies: https://bit.ly/34pQCOg

Tuesday December 15:

My Beloved Brothers in God, This Is An Invitation: The Islamic State’s Dawa and Mosques Administration – Aaron Y. Zelin, Program on Extremism: https://bit.ly/34q1FqR

IS Khorasan, the US–Taliban Deal, and the Future of South Asian Security – Kabir Taneja, Observer Research Foundation: https://bit.ly/3alkmj6

Wednesday December 16:

Confronting the caliphate? Explaining civil resistance in jihadist proto-states – Isak Svensson and Daniel Finnbogason, European Journal of International Relations: https://bit.ly/34pEvAW

Thursday December 17:

Dialoguing and negotiating with Al-Shabaab: the role of clan elders as insider-partial mediators – Mohammed Ibrahim Shire, Journal of Eastern African Studies: https://bit.ly/2Kx8waJ

The Future of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan & Pakistan – Abdul Sayed, Center for Global Policy: https://bit.ly/3p5mEXA

Friday December 18:

Intersections of Extremisms: White Nationalist/Salafi-Jihadi Propaganda Overlaps and Essentialist Narratives about Muslims – Meili Criezis, Journal of Education in Muslim Societies: https://bit.ly/3aFnx5d

Articles of the Week – 8/29-9/4

Sunday August 30:

Sectarianism in the service of Salafism: Shiites as a political tool for Jordanian Salafis – Joas Wagemakers, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies: https://bit.ly/3jN1ScJ

Monday August 31:

Failure to Launch: The Islamic State’s Misadventures in Malaysia – Munira Mustaffa, The ISIS Reader: bit.ly/32KaWIF

ISIS Resurgence in Al Hawl Camp and Human Smuggling Enterprises in Syria: Crime and Terror Convergence? – Christian Vianna de Azevedo, Perspectives on Terrorism: bit.ly/3lGVLIX

Why has al-Qaeda gone quiet in Syria? – Mina al-Lami, BBC Monitoring: https://bit.ly/3ibI6XO

How the Coronavirus Is Affecting American Jihadist Travelers – Andrew Mines, Lawfare: https://bit.ly/2ERAHyO

Inside the Foreign Fighter Pipeline to Syria: A Case Study of a Portuguese Islamic State Network – Nuno Tiago Pinto, CTC Sentinel: https://bit.ly/3hZlcCZ

The Islamic State’s Strategic Trajectory in Africa: Key Takeaways from its Attack Claims – Tomasz Rolbiecki, Pieter Van Ostaeyen, and Charlie Winter, CTC Sentinel: bit.ly/31KkZy8

Wednesday September 2:

Decoding Hate: Using Experimental Text Analysis to Classify Terrorist Content – Abdullah Alrhmoun, Shiraz Maher, and Charlie Winter, GNET: https://bit.ly/3lNUVKh

Who Is the New Leader of Islamic State-Khorasan Province? – Abdul Sayed, Lawfare: https://bit.ly/2QT1FrU

Does Deradicalization Work? – John Horgan, Katharina Meredith, and Katerina Papatheodorou, Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization: https://bit.ly/3jP6VJw

Pressure to prove: Muslim converts’ activism and radicalism mediated by religious struggle and punishing Allah reappraisal – Ari D. Fodeman, Daniel W. Snook, and John G. Horgan, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression: https://bit.ly/3jH6u3W

Thursday September 3:

Rebel Governance at the Time of Covid-19: Emergencies as Opportunities for Rebel Rulers – Marta Furlan, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: https://bit.ly/2EYt1dZ

Who Said We Were Terrorists? Issues with Terrorism Data and Inclusion Criteria – Wesley S. McCann, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: https://bit.ly/3i0V5LY

Friday September 4:

Can Communal Violence Fuel an ISIS Threat in India? An Analysis of ‘Voice of Hind’ – Prithvi Iyer and Maya Mirchandani, Observer Research Foundation: bit.ly/358w4Lg

Articles of the Week – 7/25-7/31

Saturday July 25:

Maoist Hybridity? A Comparative Analysis of the Links between Insurgent Strategic Practice and Tactical Hybridity in Contemporary Non-State Armed Groups – Edward Stoddard, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: https://bit.ly/39JSe6N

Monday July 27:

Contending with Turkey’s Islamic State Returnees – Nigar Göksel and Berkay Mandıracı, War on the Rocks: https://bit.ly/30gVbZG

Extremist Offender Management in Europe: Country Reports – ICSR: https://bit.ly/2D5ZpKN

“I Will Tell You a Story about Jihad”: ISIS’s Propaganda and Narrative Advertising – Anna Kruglova, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: https://bit.ly/3fhFNk3

Tuesday July 28:

Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and Al-Shabaab’s Amniyat – Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, African Security Review: https://bit.ly/2Xh3y5r

Dogmatism or pragmatism? Violent extremism and gender in the central Sahel – Luca Raineri, International Alert: https://bit.ly/3fdHLBX

Boko Haram’s Expansionary Project in Northwestern Nigeria: Can Shekau Outflank Ansaru and Islamic State in West Africa Province? – Jacob Zenn, Terrorism Monitor: https://bit.ly/2XcyZxC

Wednesday July 29:

Is Religion a Barrier to Peace? Religious Influence on Violent Intrastate Conflict Termination – Mora Deitch, Terrorism and Political Violence: https://bit.ly/3jZZlwQ

ISIS in South Asia: Struggle for Survival Beyond ‘Khorasan’ July 29, 2020 – Shweta Desai and Amarnath Amarasingam, Center for Global Policy: https://bit.ly/3hYQcTr

Thursday July 30:

National Extraction, Geographical Origin and Migratory Ancestry among Jihadists in Spain – Carola García-Calvo, Fernando Reinares, and Álvaro Vicente, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: https://bit.ly/33b18Jq

Telegram’s anti-IS Campaign: Effectiveness, Perspectives, and Policy Suggestions – Meili Criezis, GNET: https://bit.ly/2BLytiK

Child is Father of the Man? Retribution or Reintegration of ISIS Youth in Mosul, Iraq – Vera Mironova and Sam Whitt: https://bit.ly/2XcWAyi

Former Extremist Interviews Current Extremist: Self-Disclosure and Emotional Engagement in Terrorism Studies – Mehmet Ümit Necef, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: https://bit.ly/3jXA5Ht

Choosing to Fight, Choosing to Die: Examining How ISIS Foreign Fighters Select Their Operational Roles – Tyler Evans, Daniel J Milton, and Joseph K Young, International Studies Review: https://bit.ly/2DGksDB

Friday July 31:

The End of the Sahelian Anomaly: How the Global Conflict between the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida Finally Came to West Africa – Héni Nsaibia and Caleb Weiss, CTC Sentinel: bit.ly/3jWQkof

The Threat from Europe’s Jihadi Prisoners and Prison Leavers – Robin Simcox and Hannah Stuart, CTC Sentinel: bit.ly/2EDyQwY

New release from Iḥsān Allah Iḥsān: “The Story Of the Rise and Fall of ISIS in Khurāsān”

Before announcing its organizational setup in Khorasan, ISIS had contacts with many jihadist groups in the region. They wanted to announce a comprehensive structure for Khorasan that could compete with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan who founded the Taliban movement in September 1996. The biggest difficulty for ISIS in establishing an organizational structure in the region was the respect found in jihadi circles for the Islamic Emirate. Many militants had given bayah (allegiance) to Mullah Mohammed Omar, the spiritual leader of IEA. No commander or group could afford to oppose the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan due to years of ideological and emotional attachment which was difficult for all groups to overcome in one fell swoop. Therefore, the TTP Orakzai, a part of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), were given the leadership of ISIS Khorasan because Commander Hafiz Saeed Orakzai and his group shared religious ideals and belonged to the same school of thought. In addition, the Arab Mujahideen which is part of ISIS had previous contacts with both Sheikh Maqbool (also known as Shahidullah Shahid, former spokesperson for TTP) and Hafiz Saeed Orakzai.

These people did not have a history of positive feelings towards the Islamic Emirate. They considered IEA to be a regional organization or movement limited to Afghanistan. The question arose, why hadn’t they declared the ideology of global jihad instead of concentrating on a national focus? They also expressed these feelings in private but their small numbers and the respect of other groups for the Islamic Emirate forced them to remain silent.

After the establishment of ISIS’s Khorasan branch, a media campaign was launched for them to attract other fighters. This campaign was effective and many people moved from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi to ISIS Khorasan. I remember that Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (a break- away group from TTP) was also made an offer by ISIS to become a part of ISIS Khorasan. This was also discussed within the organization (Jamaat ul Ahrar). The head of the Jamaat ul Ahrar, Omar Khalid Khorasani wanted to join ISIS but three or four other people, including myself, opposed it. However despite this, we were ordered to start supporting ISIS in the media unannounced or at least not to oppose the group. In addition, ISIS contacted TTP and tried to use persuasive tactics but these approaches were strongly rejected. Some commanders went individually in support of ISIS but after a while they too became remorseful and joined TTP again.

As the debate over joining ISIS within the Jamaat-ul-Ahrar escalated, we decided in consultation that instead of joining the Khurasan branch of ISIS, we should be made head of ISIS’s “Wilayah Hind” which includes Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. ISIS main focus was however Afghanistan and they refused to accept the demand of Jamaat-ul-Ahrar. To achieve this goal, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar sent a delegation, one was also sent to ISIS Central Command in Iraq and Syria, which I will describe in detail on another occasion.

Attitude of ISIS, operations and the distancing of fighters from the group.

After announcing the existence of ISIS in Khorasan, ISIS then declared the caliphate in the region, but they were not prepared for it at all.

ISIS fighters have mostly occupied Pashtun areas of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan where there is a tradition and culture that the residents are not willing to give up, especially if someone tries to force them. ISIS did not respect or realize this and they wanted to impose a self-styled caliphate on its residents and impose its own ideology. As a result, people became fierce opponents of the group and even took up arms and started forming anti-ISIS lashkars. ISIS responded by carrying out extremely inhumane acts against the common people which proved to be the starting point of their downfall. In addition, ISIS did not take any precaution in its operations against government targets in Afghanistan, targeting mostly civilians who, according to its ideology, had the right to be expelled from Islam and killed.

In view of this practice, Sheikh Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost, who introduced ISIS in the region not only quit the group but also declared their actions un-Islamic and inhumane which was a great shock to ISIS. Later on the Tehreek-e-Taliban also issued a fatwa against ISIS. These announcements and fatwas naturally raised suspicions among the militants about ISIS. One of the main reasons for the militant keeping a distance from ISIS was that they forced those who joined the organization to follow a particular school of thought because they considered other people as heretics and misguided. It is a very difficult decision for any religious person to leave his school of thought, this process kept the militants away from ISIS. Public opinion also formed very quickly against ISIS and none accepted the group wholeheartedly. That is why the people or other groups who were thinking of moving towards them, in reality moved away.

Islamic Emirate declares war against ISIS.

Claims of operations by the Afghan government and NATO forces against ISIS continue to surface however the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan challenged the group soon after it formed and IEA continue to have a key role to play in kicking ISIS out of the region. The government operations against ISIS were limited in impact because the government did not exist in areas where ISIS had strongholds. Therefore, as soon as the operations started, ISIS would move to other nearby areas after a slight resistance and re-settle when the operation ended. In addition, information on the relations of ISIS with various states and their sponsorship began to surface through a series of rumours. I will analyse these during later sessions with some undeniable facts highlighting how state operations against ISIS were largely ineffective.

In contrast, when the Islamic Emirate launched operations against ISIS, this proved disastrous for them. These operations were more effective because the Islamic Emirate was not only present at the local level but also most importantly had the support of the people of Nangarhar behind them. After operations against ISIS in different parts of the country, ISIS fled to Kunar, another province of Afghanistan, where they already had hideouts. A determined Islamic Emirate pursued them here as well and as soon as winter was over they launched operations against ISIS dispersing their fighters and making it difficult for them to live in the mountains.

Surrender of ISIS fighters and the arrests of leadership.

The Islamic Emirate’s successive operations against ISIS have killed most of its remaining fighters who survived earlier operations. It became increasingly difficult for ISIS to survive in the mountainous areas of Kunar and Nangarhar in Afghanistan. This was due to the disconnect of ISIS Khorasan from ISIS Central Command in Iraq and Syria that had previously sent delegations to each other and the constant war situation, they also fell victim to a severe financial crisis which led to a state of chaos within the organization.

In this difficult situation, ISIS Khurasan fighters had two options, either to be killed or to surrender to the Afghan government. ISIS fighters began surrendering in the hope that they would be released after being held in a rehabilitation centre for some time because there were already known examples where the Afghan government released those who had given themselves up.

Following operations by the Islamic Emirate, the surviving leadership of ISIS turned to the cities of Afghanistan from where the news of fellow fighters being arrested was emerging. The names of Aslam Farooqi and Abu Omar Al-Khurasani are noteworthy. After contacting some former friends inside ISIS, Abu Talha Khurasani claimed that his arrested leadership had surrendered to the Afghan government which had declared his arrest but their claims are difficult to substantiate.

In light of all this, I can say with certainty that it is now impossible for ISIS to maintain its presence in this region (Khorasan). The implementation of the peace agreement between the United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan will make their problems worse and it will be impossible for ISIS to stay there. The only way for ISIS to survive is for an agency or the state to sponsor the group and breathe new life into it. In the past, states and agencies have taken such a course for their own interests.

_________________

Articles of the Week – 6/6-6/12

Saturday June 6:

Exploring the hidden social networks of ‘lone actor’ terrorists – David Bright, Chad Whelan, and Shandon Harris-Hogan, Crime, Law and Social Change: https://bit.ly/3hfo0fk

Monday June 8:

The future of the Islamic State’s Women: assessing their potential threat – Jessica Davis, ICCT: https://bit.ly/2YwBc79

Tuesday June 9:

On the Reported Death of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb’s Emir Abdelmalek Droukdel – Alex Thurston, Sahel Blog: https://bit.ly/30B96ub

Islamic State in Khorasan: Attempting to Absorb Rival Groups – Amira Jadoon, Center for Global Policy: https://bit.ly/2YqXqaF

Brokers of Legitimacy: Women in Community-Based Armed Groups – Hilary Matfess, Resolve Network: https://bit.ly/3fja3eB

Strategic Targeting: The Islamic State and Use of Violence in Iraq and Syria – Michael Burch and Elise Pizzi, Terrorism and Political Violence: https://bit.ly/2Ys11Fs

Islamist radicalisation in Italy: just A myth? – Michele Groppi, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism: https://bit.ly/2MXCxyd

Musical Criminology: A Comparative Analysis of Jihadist Nasheeds and Narco Corridos – Hayat Alvi, The Air Force Journal of European, Middle Eastern, & African Affairs: https://bit.ly/30XVhWQ

Wednesday June 10:

Social Media as a Mirror of External Circumstances: Insights Into a Radical Group – Mika Josephine Moeller, GNET: https://bit.ly/2UCRjik

“Jurisprudence Beyond the State: An Analysis of Jihadist “Justice” in Yemen, Syria and Libya – Joana Cook, Haid Haid, and Inga Trauthig, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: https://bit.ly/2YwD67N

The impact of terrorism on international mergers and acquisitions: Evidence from firm-level decisions – Babet Hogetoorn and Michiel Gerritse, Journal of Peace Research: https://bit.ly/2XZOWIF

How Terrorism Spreads: Emulation and the Diffusion of Ethnic and Ethnoreligious Terrorism – Sara M. T. Polo, Journal of Conflict Resolution: https://bit.ly/2Yqxwni

Thursday June 11:

“Help for Sisters”: A Look at Crowdfunding Campaigns with Potential Links to Terrorist and Criminal Networks – Audrey Alexander, GNET: https://bit.ly/30zXpDS

Friday June 12:

Islamic Caliphate or nation state? Investigating the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s imagined community – Ben Caló, David Malet, Luke Howie, and Pete Lentini, Nations and Nationalism: https://bit.ly/3eiiRkK

Indonesia’s missing Left and the Islamisation of dissent – Vedi R. Hadiz, Third World Quarterly: https://bit.ly/37Jl7iw