To inquire about translations email: 
Anṣār al-Mujāhidīn English Forum translated an essay by Dr. Akram Ḥijāzī: “Ibn Taymiyyah Reviews”
Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin on June 22, 2010
NOTE: Anṣār al-Mujāhidīn English Forum a popular online jihādī forum has recently translated an essay by Dr. Akram Ḥijāzī, who has written several essays in the past, about the conference in Mardin, Turkey this past March, which condemned Taqī ad-Dīn Ibn Taymīyyah’s fatwā (legal ruling), which condoned the use of takfīr (excommunication). Ḥijāzī’s essay is unedited below, but before I posted a brief description/biography on Ibn Taymīyyah from some of my past research. The footnotes for the research are below Ḥijāzī’s essay.
Ibn Taymīyyah lived in Damascus during the time of the Mongol invasions of Islamic lands. This had a chilling effect because the Mongols sacked Baghdad, which was the seat of the Caliphate. Although the Mongols converted to Islam, Ibn Taymīyyah believed they were not true believers.[1] Ibn Taymīyyah was an ‘alim or religious scholar who followed the teachings of the Ḥanbali Law School, which had the strictest adherence to Islamic law of the four Sunni schools of law.
Ibn Taymīyyah spoke out against the Mongols because, in his view, they did not fully implement the sharī’ah (Islamic law).[2] Instead, they used a dual system that gave more weight to Mongol traditional law, the yassa code, which was a man-made law. The Mongols viewed Chinggis Khan as a sovereign and a prophet,[3] which would directly deviate from the Qur’anic verse 33:40 that states: “Muhammad is not the father of any man among you, but he is the Apostle of God and the Seal of the Prophets [Khātim al- Nabiyīn], and God has knowledge of all things.” Therefore, Ibn Taymīyyah viewed the Mongols as committing heresy and that they were introducing bid’ah (an innovation) that was perverting Islam.[4]
Ibn Taymīyyah also considered Shi’ism, certain aspects of Sufism and falsafah (philosophy) bid’ah as well.[5] Contrary to popular belief, though, Ibn Taymīyyah was not completely against Sufism. He was a member of the Qādirīyyah Sufi ṭarīqah (order), rather Ibn Taymīyyah took issue with certain aspects of Sufism such as the veneration of saints.[6] Ibn Taymīyyah would have also considered them sins, but not punishable by death like Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab, who misrepresented many aspects of Ibn Taymīyyah’s thought. For example, Muhammad Ibn Amḭr al-Ṣana’anī, originally a follower of ‘Abd al-Wahhab, once he decided to actually read ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s works he believed they were a “naïve and imperfect repetition of Ibn Taymīyyah’s doctrine.”[7] Further, Hamid Alger points out that: “whatever one makes of the positions assumed by Ibn Taymīyyah, there is no doubt that he was a far more rigorous and careful thinker and an infinitely prolific scholar than was Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab.”[8] Therefore, it could be argued that ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s selective use of Ibn Taymīyyah’s work and then later abridged versions of Ibn Taymīyyah’s works published by the Saudi state have created a misunderstanding of the corpus of Ibn Taymīyyah’s ideas, which is very intellectually sound compared to his caricature in much of the Western scholarship on him.
Drawing on past historical events, Ibn Taymīyyah reinterpreted the idea of jāhilīyyah and applied it to his time period. Therefore, since the Mongols adopted yassa code, they were considered by him to be in a state of jāhilīyyah.[9] This allowed Ibn Taymīyyah to call the Mongols apostates (murtadd) and pronounce takfīr (excommunication) against them from Islam. Ibn Taymīyyah viewed the Mongols as creating fitnah (disturbance, anarchy) within the Islamic community because of their differing beliefs similar to the fitnah during the period following the Kharijites assassination of the forth Caliph ‘Alī Ibn Abū Ṭālib.[10] Therefore, using qīyās (analogical reasoning), Ibn Taymīyyah issued a fatwā(legal ruling) calling for an obligatory jihād (farḍ al-‘ayn) against the Mongols and those who supported them, which stated: “Every group of Muslims [in reference to the Mongols] that transgresses Islamic law [the implementation of the Mongols’ yassa code] … must be combated, even when they continue to profess the credo.”[11]
It is worthwhile to examine two notions that are misrepresented about Ibn Taymīyyah in the literature. First, Ibn Taymīyyah did not promote capital punishment for apostasy as has been interpreted by later jihadists from his thought. As Mohammad Hashim Kamali points out: “[Ibn Taymīyyah] held that apostasy is a sin which carries no ḥadd (fixed) punishment and that a sin of this kind may be punished only under the discretionary punishment of ta’zīr (corporal).”[12] As such, Ibn Taymīyyah does not view apostasy as a capital crime, which jihadists do today. Indeed, Ibn Taymīyyah called to kill the apostate Mongols, but it was only specific to that instance since if one looked to Ibn Taymīyyah’s full collection of work, which jihadists do not do they would realize they are completely taking his work out of context. The other problematic interpretation of Ibn Taymīyyah is that he believed that one should rebel against any leader who did not fully adhere to the Islamic faith. In truth, similar to the orthodox Sunni ‘ulamā’ understanding, Ibn Taymīyyah believed one should be obedient to their leader even if they were unjust. Victor E. Makari explains Ibn Taymīyyah’s views: “To be obedient to those in authority is not only commanded by God, but also is itself an extension of the believer’s obedience to Him and to His Prophet.”[13] Later Makari explains: “Ibn Taymīyyah placed social peace above the exercise of the right to dissent.”[14] Moreover, Ibn Taymīyyah stated: “It is the duty of Muslims to obey their ruler whether he is impious or ignorant,” as long as Muslims are allowed to practice their faith without interference.[15]
–
“Ibn Taymiyyah Reviews” By Dr.Akram Hijazi
Rajab 08, 1431 A.H, Monday, June 21, 2010
In the name of Allah, the most Merciful and Compassionate
Ansar al-Mujahideen English Forum
Translation and Languages Department
presents
An English Translation of Al-Moraqeb Center Article
Ibn Taymiyyah Reviews
Penned By Dr. Akram Hijazi
-May Allah Protect Him-
Fifteen scholars from different Islamic countries presented their interpretation of the fatwa by Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya at the end of a conference convened in the city of Mardin in south-east Turkey on 27-28 March 2010. The conference was organized by the Global Center for Renewal and Guidance (London) on collaboration with the Canopus Islamic Foundation for Consultations (London) and Artuklu University (Mardin). Taking part in the conference were participants from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Indonesia, Bosnia, Morocco, Nigeria, India, Albania, Yemen, Senegal, Kuwait and Mauritania. Also in attendance were six Sheikhs from Saudi Arabia, including Abdullah Umar Naseef, Abdul Wahhab al-Turayri, Abdullah al-Borak, Nasser al-Hanini, Ayedh al-Dusari and Hassan Filimban in addition to Sheikh Abdullah Bin Bayah, executive president of the Global Center for Renewal and Guidance, the Mufti of Bosnia, Sheikh Mustafa Ceric, Qadi Sheikh Abdullah Walad ‘Ala Salem, president of the Supreme Constitutional Council in Mauritania, Sheikh al-Habeeb Ali al-Jifri from Yemen and others. The main topics discussed in the conference were as follows:
· The Mardin Fatwa: time, place, circumstances and context
· The categorization of an abode in traditional fiqh and in the light of modern globalization and communications.
· The importance of the Fatwa in light of Islamic history
· Understanding of Jihad: the conditions of armed conflict and rules of engagement, as defined by Ibn Taymiyya and the United Nations Charter.
Undoubtedly those following reactions will find that most of those who have welcomed the Mardin fatwa are secularists, atheists, rafidites, Sufis,Qabbouris, Jews, Crusaders, the Sultans’ preachers, those opposed to the global Jihad movement, and even the simple-minded! Are there then those who will justify all this uproar over the conference? And what is the truth about the contents of the closing statement issued by it?
The first thing that attracts attention in the closing statement issued by the conference is the media release about the nature of the conference, its topic, its starting points and its aims.
Nature of the conference: The statement called the conference only “Peace Summit Conference.”
Topic of the conference: “To study the most important foundations of the relations between Muslims and their fellow human beings and classification of abodes in Islamic thought and related issues in defining jihad, loyalty and enmity (al-wala’ wal-bara’), citizenship andmigration (hijra).”
Goal of the conference: “Achieve peaceful co-existence and cooperation between Muslims and others” in light of “the contemporary reality which binds Muslims to international treaties through which security and peace have been achieved for all mankind and guarantee their wealth, their integrity and their homelands, based upon which Muslims now interact with others in an unprecedented manner in many political, social and economic matters. Muslims are in need of sound Islamic legal visionwhich does not violate Islamic religious texts, but are in harmony with the aims of shari’ah while adapting to the contemporary reality.
The theme for the conference: “The fatwa of Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya, may Allah have mercy on him, concerning the classification of the city of Mardin in his lifetime. This was the theme for research, because of the exceptional intellectual, cultural and symbolic meaning it holds.”
General Discussion
Political Agenda
According to his statements made to Islam Today on 4th of April 2010, Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayah said: “A meeting of the different (parties) across the Islamic spectrum is an expression of the attempt to find a common view on matters which concern their fate which are issues of internal struggle”, while adding: “We in the International Center have invited groups who specialize in the Sheikh of Islam from different schools and philosophies, in order to achieve unity regarding issues of the Ummah, so that some of us can be convinced by the others, just like the Mardin University.” However, all of those attending the conference belonged to one political school; standing directly and unambiguously in the corner of the existing political and international regimes. Their fatwa is subsequently more political in nature than religious. And so? What has gathered together those who belong to ideological schools that are supposedly contradictory and competitive in their beliefs such as Salafism, Sufism, Shi’ism and secularism other than their common interests and goals in targeting the movements of resistance and jihad? What right permits them to have dogmatic differences on its importance and at the same time reach an agreement on leaving behind Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa!!? Have they all one day arrived at the same distance from Ibn Taymiyya!!!?
As for calling the conference “The Peace Summit Conference”, it is not devoid of indications that the conference was convened in accordance with an international agenda or directly complies with Western initiatives, especially since in the words of one observer, there was coordination between the British and Turkish governments before it was convened.
The strange thing is that none of the scholars from the countries or peoples being occupied, oppressed or threatened with extinction attended the conference and they were not represented in it from near or far. It was as if they were not part of the Ummah or that their countries have been forgotten or ripped away from human existence. Among those absent and missing were scholars from East Turkestan, Palestine, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Jammu and Kashmir, Thailand and Nigeria. Rather those who had planned the conference had already scripted its goals and outcomes previously.
Second: Peaceful Co-existence
The Fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya was not itself the goal of the conference even though it had announced it was based upon his works and thought. Rather the goal was to demolish the idea of dividing the Islamic world into two abodes (the abode of Islam and the abode of war; Dar al-Islamand Dar al-Harb). This is not an idea produced by Ibn Taymiyya alone, but it is integral to the Islamic creed. But the conferees believe, according to the final statement, which states: “The classification of abodes in Islamic jurisprudence is an Ijtihadi (juristic) classification dictated by the circumstances of the Islamic Ummah and the nature of international relations as prevalent then. However, the change in circumstances now and the existence of recognized international treaties, the criminalization of wars based on other than a response to aggression and resistance to occupation, and the emergence of the civil states which guarantee on the whole, the rights of (different) creeds, ethnicities and nationalities; has necessitated declaring the entire world a place of mutual toleration and peaceful co-existence among all faiths and sects in the framework of establishing common good and justice among people, wherein they enjoy safety and security with respect to their wealth, their habitations and their dignity. This is what shari’ah affirmed and called for since the Prophet, blessings of Allah and peace be upon him, emigrated to Medina and concluded the first treatyguaranteeing peaceful co-existence among all parties and ethnicities in the framework of justice and common interests. Shortcomings and violations perpetrated by certain statesthat corrupt or scar this process should not be used as a pretext for denying its validity and fabricating conflict between it and Islamic shari’ah.”
Therefore, changes that have occurred in mankind have necessitated making the entire world a place of mutual tolerance and peaceful co-existence! Subsequently, international political regimes, international law and all its organizations are correct, legal, recognized and agreed upon between peoples and the United Nations! This mutual toleration, peaceful co-existence, justice and security has clearly appeared in Somalia, Iraq, Palestine, Sudan, Algeria, Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Eastern Turkestan, Thailand, Kashmir, the Philippines and Nigeria. As for the failure or violation of this co-existence only certain countries have done this like the United States, which invaded Iraq along with 32 other countries without a Security Council resolution. Western Europe, some Asian countries, Ethiopia, Israel, Russia, the Nigerian police who massacred thousands of Muslims in the streets, and China who have oppressed the peoples of East Turkestan for more than 200 years to the point where the country has almost been exterminated. This violation does not effect the situation of peaceful co-existence and mutual toleration.
This tiresome co-existence among creeds, ethnicities and nationalities ignore the vicious wars against Islam and the Muslims, the defamation of their reputation and image, the attack on their Prophet, the prohibition on building mosques and minarets, the ban on niqabs, the war on thehijab, firing upon and hacking the glorious Quran, tearing the flesh of Muslim women and slaughtering innocents. This kind of co-existence is not reflected in the statement, and is not recognized in it, and it does not hold to account any international law or aggressor nation for any kind of responsibility, rather this word is not reflected in the statement in the first place.
As for Ahmad Ozul, a lecturer in the Islamic Studies Institute in Istanbul, he was bluntwhen he indicated in an interview with the newspaperTawadi Zaman that “The final statement of the conference addresses the Western world more than the Islamic world.” This was also expressed by the actions of the Turkish journalists in immediately translating the works of the conference to the English language and distributing it to different Western media sources. And if we read the statements of Mustafa Ciric, the Mufti of Bosnia, whose people were massacred in the recent past, let them clarify the picture more and eliminate astonishment. What did he say: “We do not have to look at secular liberalism as an enemy of Islam, rather we must push in the direction where the western secular model absorbs more religious values in everyday social life.” And his Excellency added: “There no longer is any meaning to the term Islamic state on the evidence that Muslims largely find religious rights and freedom in Western nations, much more so than is the case in any Islamic country. There is no distinction between an Islamic state and non-Islamic states, rather the distinction is between countries that offer justice, freedom and security and those that do not.” Enough! This is the reality of the conference, and there is no need to talk about Caliphate and Islamic rule, on Muslims and non-Muslims, or if a callwas harmed or aided, or whether a method is correct or if it is futile. The struggle with the West now proceeds in the framework of searching for loopholes for relations with it based upon appeasing it, and accepting its ideology in exchange for its embracing the Muslims.
Third: Bringing Down Jihad
The final statement for the conference believes that “Responsibility falls upon the scholars of the Ummah to clearly and explicitly condemn all forms of violence-to-change or protest inside or outside Muslim societies and state the truth without obscurity or ambiguity.” As for what pertains to “Fighting in the Cause of Allah”: “The law and authority to execute and implement it is entrusted first to those who lead the community (heads of state) as a political decision with weighty consequences derived from that.” Therefore, “It is not permitted for the individual Muslim or a group of Muslims to declare war or engage in combative Jihad of their own accord. This (restriction) is to prevent much evil and to truly uphold religious texts on this matter.”
No doubt that this language was not drafted with any connection to the Ibn Taymiyya fatwa worth mentioning. Many have preceded them in saying this and this has no significance for the fatwa. Everything in this matter, from first to last, has been said previously by the Organization of the Islamic Conference which eliminated the definition of Jihad from the work schedule of its annual summit, beginning with the summit in the Senegalese capital Dakar on December 23, 1991, which convened the day after the end of the second Gulf War. In our second article in the series of “The Stormy Autumn of Gaza – Eliminating Jihadand Raping the Resistance”, from January 21, 2009, we paused at the official position on Jihad and all forms of resistance and we said that the decision of the Dakar conference to drop Jihad meant that Arab and Muslim rulers:
· They will not announce it one day, because it no longer exists on their political agenda. And, because they are not committed to it even theoretically and subsequently what need is there to commit to it practically.
· If they had risked Jihad as a religious obligation and vacated the legal ruling on the Palestinian situation officially, what will prevent them from risking resistance as a popular choice which equates to nothing when compared to a religious doctrinal choice?
· They will try to put in placethe culture of “peace” in the official Arab political mind, along the American path, in a fundamental manner to replace the culture of resistance let alone the culture of Jihad.
· They will not accept any Jihadist movement to the extent that they will assign to it all causes of condemnation and failure if it is not connected to their policies.
· They will evade recognizing any flag of Jihad or resistance while on the contrary any American intervention in the region against Jihadist groups will be welcomed, (because) they have become terrorist groups!
· They will take extreme measures against every dogmatic culture beginning with banning preaching against the Jews and Crusaders on the way to cleansing the mosques of “provocative” preachers and lecturers, harassing them and even throwing oppositionist scholars into prison or marginalizing them and encroaching upon their educational program and ending the granting of government license permitting satellite preaching.
It is established that the sovereign rulers had not previously declared Jihad based on the Mardin or other Fatwa, and they had not previously voided (Jihad) based on them! We do not understand how Jihad can be dependant upon the leader of the community (the sovereign ruler) when he is the one who legally and politically voided it in all forms, including nationalist. In so far the fatwa speaks originally of co-existence, peace and security, it is natural that the conferees would resort to connecting Jihad to the responsibilityof the ruler. Meaning the fatwa is in perfect harmony with the official position which abandons Jihad and resistance. This alone is enough to void the legality of the fatwa, because in its basis it only takes into consideration the current political calculus.
Thenwhich ruleris meant? And what is his creed? What is the extent of his legitimacy? What if he was a fabrication of the enemy in the first place? What about his policies and clientage to the West and his assistance to them? What is the legal position when Paul Bremer, the first American civilian ruler of Iraq was regarded by some sheikhs and scholars as the sovereign ruler to whom fell the victory and to whom obedience was a duty? What is the position on Jihad if the ruler is an occupying invader? And what is the situation if the country is ruled by the laws of occupation and its constitutions? What is the official position on what some other sheikhs might consider a duty if the occupation (forces) were raiding homes? When does Jihad become a duty?
The infallibility which the Mardin jurists have bestowed upon the sovereign ruler and stripped away from his rivals does not take into consideration the conditions of sovereignty, and does not mention at all any of the legal situations in which the Ummah is obligated to depose the ruler and strip him of his sovereignty. The ruler can commit treason or apostasy and form alliances with enemies. There are many examples of this in Islamic history. So what is the judgement on him? Then what is the position of the Mardin scholars on the ruling against Arab leaders whom previous scholars had judged guilty of apostasy and kufr. Did the Mardin fatwa duplicate those rulings? Does not this logic make even the Pharaohs legal sovereign rulers!
If it is the duty of the scholars to condemn all forms of violence-to-change and protest, and condemn every group that revolts against the sovereign ruler in declaring Jihad, and regard Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa as non-applicable for this time, then what about the violence which the sovereign ruler is able to practice against the general public internally and externally? Was the Salvation Front which won the elections in Algeria in 1990, for example practicing bloody violence when the military launched the coup against them and were they devoting themselves to murdering society? What is the legal ruling on those who conducted the coup? Were they compelled to launch the coup by some great misdeed? Amazing!!!
If every action of the sovereign ruler falls within the Islamic framework then what is the ruling on the opposition when they make alliance with a foreign, non-Muslim enemy and one day summon foreign forces to remove (the ruler) as happened in Iraq? What is the legal ruling on the ruler and those who oppose him among those who have sought foreign aid against others? What is the true state of the victorious faction? Is its existence or non-existence conditional upon the ruler? There is an astounding contradiction in the Mardin announcement which does not go beyond the present moment lived by the ruler strictly speaking. It provided no (legal) foundation to the extent that it provided political positions.
Fourth: Loyalty and Enmity
The Mardinjuristshave renounced al-wala’ wal-bara’ (loyalty and enmity) “unless it is connected to a kuffar belief”, and it is not mentioned in any situation according to the statement; to five obligatory judgements which are “permissible, recommended, not recommended, non-permissible and required”, which is nothing but acceptance of international law, treaties, national relations and the rights and duties about which the final statement speaks. It is therefore natural that the definition degrades to its lowest level in order to reinforcethe call for peace and confine Jihad in the hands of the sovereign ruler.
Even though we know that the most prominent of contemporary scholars have issued fatwas regarding international law and all man-made laws as kaffir laws, but according to the statement they are “recognized”! So who established its legitimacy? And who, other than Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayah and his supporters, said that: “There is no great disparity between international pacts and Islamic law with regards to the law of war and peace…the situation now is distinguished by the existence of treaties which govern the entire world?” Who, other than Doctor Hassan bin Muhammad has abandoned the division of the Islamic world into the Abode of War and Abode of Peace: “There is nothing in Islamic law”, and “The root of establishing relations between nations is peaceful ties, and this is what accords with the peaceful program set forth by the Messenger, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, by corresponding with kings and rulers of contemporary nations for the establishment of the Islamic State in Medina al-Munawwara, calling them to peace and security, and informing them of the establishment of the Islamic State.” To whom then was addressed the messages which included the famous phrase “Embrace Islam and you shall have peace?”
His, peace be upon him, message to Khosru, King of Persia:
“I am the Messenger of Allah to all people, let all living be warned and bear to the infidels the truth of the words, surrender to Islam and you shall have peace, if you plot, the sins of the Maji are upon you.”
His message to al-Muqauqis of Egypt:
“I call you to Islam. Submit and you shall have peace. Allah will reward you twice.”
His message to Heraclius, Emperor of Byzantium:
“I call you to the message of Islam. Submit and you shall have peace, Allah will reward you twice, if you refrain, upon you are the sins of the Arisiyin”.
If the fatwa and subsequent statements of its patrons was based upon a clear gap from which the Ummah is suffering, we would have said that the group was justified and possessed of rare courage and that they speak frankly to the Ummah. However, on the contrary, it came as a frantic effort to bypass the legal ruling at a time when Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayah has accused the adherents of Ibn Taymiyya of taking his words out of context or subtracting or adding to them, in applying shari’ah rulings.
The problem with those Islamic groups with an international bent who have discarded Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa or stripped it of legality – as al-Turayri says! – is that their view of takfiri, terrorist and hereticalgroups is considered as nothing but a coverfor the abandonment of religion and appeasement of the West. However, it will become action to discard the legitimacy of the remaining groups, and this is occurring in any case, and from there it will lead to abandonment of the basic principle and elements of religion. Then there will be no kuffarand no takfiriyeen. We have heard official sermons which view the Jews and Christians as Believers and we are aware of fatwas by scholars who think that they are Believers to a certain degree! We have monitored crazy protests against a ruling of kufr upon those who uttered it. We have read writers who praise kufr and attack Allah, the Almighty; their books and stories are distributed in Arabic countries, but the Mardin jurists did not say such as these were kufr and did not come to mention them as examples of common cases in the Ummah. Then why this affected ignorance, because they were not the targets of the conference. If it is required to abrogate the judgement of takfeer from Islam and no one remains except Believers on earth and international agreements, then what is the value of religions? What is the benefit of sending messengers and prophets? What is the value of the Believer if there is no such thing as an unbeliever? Who then are the kaffirs about whom the Glorious Quran speaks? How were they kaffir? If Allah, the Almighty created Paradise for the Believers, for whom did He create the fire? So on what basis are the people of the Global Jihad described as takfiriyeen when kaffirs are ignored, as is rejecting their kufr? Rather it is a triumph for them under the pretext of innovation and freedom of expression!!? Is there a greater infamy than this?
Finally
The Mardin fatwa calls to mind the wave of studies of prisons for detainees from the Salafist-Jihadist movements. Even though this method has been exhausted by its authors and promoters it bears witness we still observe an escalation of this matter, this time on the part of scholars, who have summoned the scholars of the Ummah from history to subject them to revisions of an unique kind. Not only this, butthe call for revisionism includes other jurists and scholars such as al-‘Izz bin Abdul Salam, al-Shatabi and others. And in the not distant future we will see reviews of Ibn Kathir, al-Bukhari, Muslim, Ibn Hashem, Ibn al-Qayyem al-Jawziyah, al-Zahabi, al-Tubra and even the imams of the four schools, eventually arriving at a review of the Glorious Quran under the pretext that some of the Ayas are not considered appropriate for contemporary language! This has previously occurred on the part of many of the atheists about whose ideas we read and became informed at any early age. This, however was not Salafist-Jihadist or anything else.
Certainly, we are not opposed to reviewing (our) heritage by acknowledgedscholars of the Ummah whenever that is necessary in a way that accompanies the times and answers independent judgements on questions posed, and stops short of the great Revelations which the Ummah scholars of old found it difficult to discover or predict. However, we will not accept reviews surrounded by thousands of questions and suspicions, while there are legal rulings and independent judgement that render them superfluous. It is amazing that it is we alone who review. It is more amazing that when we review, we do not return to where we started, but to where the Western and political regime wants us to be. This is a collapse and not a review, and it is no ijtihad.
Therefore, we need to stop the review of Shar’ia foundations that enjoy consensus, to renew the legal position concerning issues that have long departed as points of interpretation and contention, as is often the case, such as Muslim abodes, Western values, reconciliation with Israel and not with Jews, alliance with the enemies and seeking their help, international law and its agencies, ruling regimes, sovereignty of the ruler, Jihad, military bases in our countries, plundering the wealth of the Ummah, playing with its resources, lassitude, weakness, false rumors, meticulousness, distortion, innovation, superstitions, political chicanery, the economy, commerce, development, culture, relations with other civilizations and nations, the war on Islam, the killing and pursuit of sinless Muslims, the defamation of Islam and the Muslims, oppressing them, racism, attacks upon the Faith and Messenger of Allah, the peace of Allah be upon him, and insolence to Allah.
Appendix 1
Text of the Closing Statement of the Mardin Conference
In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
The Declaration of Mardin, Abode of Peace
All Praise be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds and Peace and Salutations be upon Muhammad, who has been sent as a Mercy unto the Worlds, his family and all of his companions.
A Peace Summit Conference (Mardin: The Abode of Peace), was convened in the Turkish city of Mardin at the Artuklu University campus on Saturday and Sunday (27-28 March 2010), under the auspices of the Global Center for Renewal and Guidance (GCRG – based in London), in cooperation with Canopus Consulting (based in Bristol), and sponsored by Artuklu University.
Participating in the conference was a group of renowned Muslim scholars, from across the Muslim world, who brought with them diverse and relevant specializations. They gathered in order to collectively study one of the most important (classical juridical) foundations of the relations between Muslims and fellow human beings, namely: the (classical juridical) classification of ‘abodes’ (diyar), as Islamically conceived, and other related concepts such as jihad, loyalty and enmity, citizenship, and migration (to non-Muslim territories).
They selected this juridical conceptual distinction, because of its importance in the grounding of peaceful and harmonious co-existence and cooperation for good and justice between Muslims and non-Muslims, provided that it is understood in consonance with normative religious texts and maxims, and in light of higher objectives of Islamic Law.
The organizers chose as the main research theme for the conference the legal edict (fatwa) passed by Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya concerning the classification of the city of Mardin during his lifetime. The edict was chosen, because of the significant intellectual, civilizational and symbolic meaning that it holds.
The point of it is that Ibn Taymiyya, in his classification of the city of Mardin – through his deep understanding of the Shari’ah and keen insight and awareness of the context in which he lived – went beyond the classification that was common amongst past Muslim jurists: Dividing territories into an Abode of Islam (in which the primary state is peace), an Abode of Kufr (Unbelief) (in which the primary state is war), and anAbode of ‘Ahd (Covenant) (in which the primary state is truce), amongst other divisions (that they had stipulated).
Instead of the classification common in his age, Ibn Taymiyya came up with a compound classification by virtue of which civil strife amongst Muslims was averted, and their lives, wealth, and honor safeguarded, and justice amongst them and others established.
His fatwa is one that is exceptional in its formulation and that, to a large degree, addresses a similar context to our time, a political state of the world that is different from the one encountered by past jurists, and which had formed the basis for the particular way in which they had classified territories.
It is such a changed context that Ibn Taymiyya took into consideration when passing his fatwa, and that now makes it imperative that contemporary jurists review the classical classification, because of the changed contemporary situation: Muslims are now bound by international treaties through which security and peace have been achieved for the entire humanity, and in which they enjoy safety and security, with respect to their property, integrity and homelands.
Consequently, Muslims are interacting with others in unprecedented ways: politically, socially and economically.
Contemporary jurists also need to review the classical classification of abodes, because there is a real need for a sound Islamic and legal vision that does not violate Islamic religious texts, but is in harmony with the higher objectives of the Shari’ah, and engages our contemporary context.
In light of the above, the participants presented and discussed research papers at the conference, and the following are the conclusions and recommendations reached:
First Conclusions:
1. Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa concerning Mardin can under no circumstances be appropriated and used as evidence for leveling the charge of kufr(unbelief) against fellow Muslims, rebelling against rulers, deeming game their lives and property, terrorizing those who enjoy safety and security, acting treacherously towards those who live (in harmony) with fellow Muslims or with whom fellow Muslims live (in harmony) via the bond of citizenship and peace. On the contrary, the fatwa deems all of that unlawful, not withstanding its original purpose of supporting a Muslim state against a non-Muslim state. Ibn Taymiyya agrees with all of this, and follows, the precedent of previous Muslim scholars in this regard, and does not deviate from their position. Anyone who seeks support from this fatwa for killing Muslims or non-Muslims has erred in his interpretation and has misapplied the revealed texts.
2. The classification of abodes in Islamic jurisprudence was a classification based on ijtihad (juristic reasoning), that was necessitated by the circumstances of the Muslim world then, and the nature of the international relations prevalent at that time. However, circumstances have changed now: The existence of recognized international treaties which consider as crimes wars that do not involve repelling aggression or resisting occupation; the emergence of civil states which guarantee, on the whole, religious, ethnic and national rights; have necessitated declaring, instead the entire world as a place of tolerance and peaceful co-existence between all religions, groups and factions in the context of establishing common good and justice amongst people, and wherein they enjoy safety and security with respect to their wealth, habitations and integrity. This is what the Shari’ah has been affirming and acknowledging, and to which it has been inviting humanity, ever since the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) migrated to Medina and concluded the first treaty agreement that guaranteed mutual and harmonious co-existence between the factions and various ethnic groups in a framework of justice and common interest. Shortcomings and breaches perpetrated by certain states that happen to scar and mar this process cannot and should not be used as a means for denying its validity and creating conflict between it and the Islamic Shari’ah.
3. Amongst the priorities of Muslim scholars and Islamic academic institutions should be the analysis and assessment of ideas that breed extremism, takfir (labeling fellow Muslims as unbelievers) and violence in the name of Islam. Security measures, no matter how fair and just they may happen to be, cannot take the place of an eloquent (scholarly) elucidation supported by proof and evidence. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the Ummah’s religious scholars to condemn all forms of violent attempts to change or violent protest, within or outside Muslim societies. Such condemnation must be clear, explicit, and be a true manifestation of real courage in speaking the truth, soas to eliminate any confusion or ambiguity.
4. Muslim scholars throughout the ages have always stressed and emphasized that the jihad that is considered the pinnacle of the religion of Islam, is not of one type, but of many, and actually fighting in the Path of God is only one type. The validation, authorization, and execution of this particular type of jihad is granted by the Shari’ah to only those who lead the community (actual heads of states). This is, because such a decision of war is a political decision with major repercussions and consequences. Hence, it is not for a Muslim individual or Muslim group to announce and declare war, or engage in combative jihad, whimsically and on their own. This restriction is vital for preventing much evil from occurring, and for truly upholding Islamic religious texts relevant to this matter.
5. The basis of the legitimacy of jihad is that it is either to repel aggression (“Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do nottransgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors” — Surah al-Baqarah, 190), or to aid those who are weak and oppressed (“And why should ye not fight in the cause of Allah and of those who, being weak, are ill-treated (and oppressed)?” —Surah al-Nisa’, 75), or in defense of the freedom of worshiping (“To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight), because they are wronged; — and verily, Allah is most powerful for their aid” — Surah al-Hajj, 39). It is not legitimate to declare war, because of differences in religion or in search of spoils of war.
6. The issue of fatwas in Islam is a serious one. It is for this reason that scholars have drawn up stringent prerequisites for the Mufti (the authority issuing fatwas). Of these requirements is that he must be fully qualified in scholarly knowledge. The conditions specific to the fatwa itself is having established the proper object of application (manat) according to time, place, circumstance, person and future outcome.
7. The notion of loyalty and enmity (al-wala wal-bara) must never be used to declare anyone out of the fold of Islam, unless an actual article of unbelief is held. In all other cases, it actually involves several types of judgement ranging according to the juridical five-fold scale: (permissible, recommended, not recommended, non-permissible, and required). Therefore, it is not permissible to narrow the application of this notion and use it for declaring a Muslim outside the fold of Islam.
Second Recommendations:
The participants in the conference suggested the following recommendations:
· Convening an annual conference in Europe to research and explore, the Islamic conception of peace, and peaceful co-existence, between nations and religions.
· Establishing the Mardin Center for Research in Islamic Political Theory.
· Creating research units and departments at Islamic universities and postgraduate institutions concerned with research, training, and qualifying of potential candidates, in the area of formulating and issuing fatwas on public issues pertaining to the entire Muslim Ummah.
· Encouraging theoretical and practical studies concerned with the historical conditions and circumstances effecting the issuing of religious edicts and opinions.
· Encouraging academic and scientific studies that focus on the historical circumstances and conditions in which the edicts of great scholars were issued in the past.
· Making more effort in revising, editing, and exploring the legacy of Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya – may Allah have mercy on him – and the legacy of the exemplary scholars, with respect to their impact on the Muslim world and what is hoped to be gained from a sound and correct understanding of their respective legacies in terms of guiding and directing both the general public and specialists.
· Referring the declaration to the various fiqh (juridical) academies in the Muslim world for the purpose of enriching it, deepening discussion around it and extending its benefit (to a wider audience).
In conclusion, the organizers and participants wish to extend their heartfelt gratitude and appreciation to all those who contributed to the success of the conference, and first and foremost amongst them the Governor of Mardin, the President of Artuklu University, and the Mufti of Mardin.
May God send his peace and salutation upon our master, Muhammad, his family and his Companions, and all Praise be to God through Whose bounty and favour righteous works are completed.
Appendix 2
Text of the Fatwa of Ibn Taymiyyah
He, may Allah have mercy upon him, was asked about the country of Mardin, was it the Abode of War or the Abode of Peace? Must any Muslim dwelling there emigrate to Islamic countries or not? And if he must emigrate, but does not emigrate, and he helps the enemies of the Muslims with his person and his money, does he thereby commit a sin? Does the one who insults him and accuses him of hypocrisy sin or not?
He answered:
“Praise be to Allah. The blood and wealth of Muslims are forbidden whether they are in Mardin or elsewhere. Aiding those who have deviated from the Shari’ah of the Religion of Islam is forbidden whether they are the people of Mardin or others. If a (Muslim) residing there cannot establish his Religion then migration is a duty, otherwise it is recommended but not fulfilled.
Assisting the enemy with their persons or their wealth is forbidden to them. They must refrain from that in any possible way, by omission, demonstration or cooperation. If this is not possible except by migration then this is incumbent upon them.
It is not permissible to curse them generally or to charge them with hypocrisy. Rather the curse and the charge of hypocrisy falls along the characteristics mentioned in al-Kitab wal-Sunnah, thus some of the people of Mardin and others will fall under this.
As for its being the Abode of War or of Peace, the two definitions are fixed upon it: It does not have the status of Abode of War whose people are infidels, and it does not have the status of Abode of Peace where the rulings of Islam are implemented, because its soldiers are Muslims (meaning its soldiers are not Muslims). Nor does it have the status of Abode of War whose people are infidels (for there are many Muslim residents); rather there is a third classification in which the Muslim appropriately acts, and battles those who are outside the Shari’ah of Islam as befits him”. Here ends his words, may Allah have mercy on him. (Fatwa 28: 240-241)
–
[1] Karen Armstrong. Islam: A Short History (New York: The Modern Library, 2002), 104.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Denis Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād al-Shām by Ghāzān Khān and Ibn Taymīyah’s Three “Anti-Mongol Fatwas,” Mamlūk Studies Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2007, 114.
[4] Armstrong, 104.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay (Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2002), 10.
[7] Hamadi Redissi, “The Refutation of Wahhabism in Arabic Sources, 1745-1932,” (ed.) Madawi al-Rasheed, Kingdom Without Borders: Saudi Political, Religious and Media Frontiers (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 168.
[8] Algar, 9.
[9] Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), 194.
[10] Aigle, 103.
[11] Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam (Yale University Press, 1985), 128.
[12] Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Punishment in Islamic Law: A Critique of the Hudud Bill of Kelantan, Malaysia,” Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1998, 213; Ibn Taymīyyah, al-Ṣārim al-Maslūl, Muḥayy al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Ḥamid (ed.) (Beirut: Daral- Kitab, 1978), p. 318.
[13] Victor E. Makari, Ibn Taymīyyah’s Ethics: The Social Factor (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983), 154.
[14] Ibid., 156.
[15] Ibid.
Like this:
This entry was posted on June 22, 2010 at 8:35 AM and is filed under Anṣār al-Mujāhidīn English Forum, Forums, Taqī ad-Dīn Ibn Taymīyyah. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. Both comments and pings are currently closed.
25 Responses to “Anṣār al-Mujāhidīn English Forum translated an essay by Dr. Akram Ḥijāzī: “Ibn Taymiyyah Reviews””
Sorry, the comment form is closed at this time.
Abu Talxah al-Amrikii said
Bismillah,
I do not know if you have actually read what Bin Taimiyyah has written, but you biography reflects a number of inaccuracies on the opinions of Bin Taymiyyah regarding who is to be fought and killed. A long list of such groups can be found in Majmuc al-Fataawa volume 28 in various locations.
Also, while Bin Taimiyyah did not advocate rebelling against an oppressor or an impious ruler, that is similarly not what is being called for today. What Bin Taimiyyah did was he declared that the one who did not rule by the Shari’ah in its entirety regarding issues of which there was an ijmac (consensus) was a kaafir (disbeliever). This might not seem like it is advocating rebellion in and of itself, but this is what it is, in fact, advocating. Virtually every scholar (including Bin Taimiyyah in vol. 28 of his fataawa) has mentioned that it is fard al-cain (an individual obligation) to rebel against the ruler who has disbelieved.
The concept of executing an apostate is not an area of difference of opinion among Muslim scholars. Ash-Shafi’ii, Abu Haniifah, Malik, Axmad, Bin Kuzaimah, Cumar bin al-Khattaab, Abu Bakr, and countless others all reflected this notion.
Also, the issue of rebelling against the ruler who has disbelieved and takfir have nothing to do with Bin Taimiyyah. Such concepts have been a foundation of Islaam since the beginning. One of the first wars in Islaamic history is called, “The War Against the Apostates.” Also, ijmac (consensus of the Muslims) has been reported on the issue from numerous scholars from every madhab. Al-Qadii Iyaad reported it. Also, An-Nawawii and Ibn Xajar al-Asqalaanii reported it.
If you want to read on the ruling on the apostate more then you can read Bin Taimiyyah’s book As-Saarim al-Maslooh.
Ibn Siqilli said
The college drop-out “mujtahid” has spoken.
“bin” Taymiyyah=Ibn Taymiyyah
Abu Talxah al-Amrikii said
Ahh, the confused orientalist, always a treat. Were you “Kufr Akbar” on Anwar’s blog, or was that a different person who linked to you site?
Mind you citing where I have made ijtihaad on a subject? If I did, then I should not have and it would be nice to have an error pointed out.
With regard to the college drop-out thing, then I made that decision when I realized I did not stand to benefit at all from remaining in school (although I think I am technically still enrolled). George Mason’s government and Islamic studies programs were terrible to say the least, and I lost interest in Japanese which was my other intended major.
Some of the professors I encountered in the government program were very good, maa sha’a Allah, but I found it hard to take a class seriously which allowed you to go on Google and look up the answers to a test . I actually refused to do this, because it felt too much like I was cheating. When you have to pay out of your own pocket for school, then you want it to be a good investment.
The Islamic studies program was a waste of time, and the professors seemed to know less than the students. I guess that is why it is only available as a minor. Alxamdulillah they seemed to try to portray Islaam in the best way they could, but this resulted in a lot of strange errors.
I do feel kind of bad for dropping out, because I put the admissions board through a whole bunch of nonsense for them to re-accept me after I turned them down.
Ibn Siqilli said
Perhaps you could outline the main points of Sa’idian Orientalism you think I meet. Or perhaps you mean a different type of Orientalism. German, perhaps? Russian? French, like Rodinson? British, like Gibb? Spanish? Italian, like Gabrielli? Hungarian, like Goldziher?
No, I was/am not “Kufr Akbar.”
I can refer to you as “al-Qadi” if you prefer, or “al-shaykh,” because if Gadahn can be one, anyone can.
I’m not sure which professors in George Mason’s IS program you’re referring to; perhaps they’ve expanded the list of affiliated faculty. It was a minor, though it will eventually be a B.A. as they’ve expanded the program significantly, because that’s what the state of Virginia approved originally.
Ibn Siqilli said
Your adoption of, if I’m not mistaken, Somali transliteration of words originally taken from Arabic in the al-Qimmah style is strangely endearing.
Abu Talxah al-Amrikii said
In my handwriting I prefer what is in the title, but the Somali method is the nicest as far as conveying the pronunciation without using numbers. I do not fully use the Somali method when it comes to using a ‘y,’ because in Arabic the fatixah plus the yaa is actually pronounced a+ii, but it sounds like ay. Also, the apostrophe gets confusing when it is in the middle of a word.
You study Islam in order to figure out how to “occidentalize” the Muslims. Do you do it to the extreme that was attempted in the past? No, but you do seek to a particular group of Muslims to a more palatable view to a western understanding. You also do it through some degree of imitation, which is consistent with the second wave of orientalists which came after the crusade wave.
The definition I am using is the one that Muslims use when they study Orientalism, which would refer to just about anyone who studies Islam in order to influence the Muslims. I believe the 1996 IANA conference has a tape on the topic, from a professor at Madinah University if you want some insight into the way Muslims scholars define an Orientalist.
I would not describe the professors I had as Orientalists, but they were certainly confused on a lot of issues. The two whom I had before quitting were a journalist and a history professor. The journalist recently wrote some book about Muslims contributions to science, but I do not remember his name. The history teacher was an Isma’ilii who never really bothered even learning that. Although studying that branch of Shi’ism and teaching on Islam would be like studying the Puritans and teaching on Christianity.
She was good with the history side of things. She even justified 9-11 to a class which was about 20% made up of marines. However, I was enrolled in the IS/MES minor to try to learn about Islam a little bit.
Gadahn is starting to get into the Shaikh age range, but I am nowhere near that. I don’t think Gadahn has ever said something which was his own ijtihad either. Shaikh is a term that gets thrown around a lot with no real qualification associated with it.
Qaadii does not really make sense, as it is not a term associated with a degree of knowledge, but it is a position/occupation. Calam, mufti, and mujtahid are some terms which directly refer to someone’s knowledge without any ambiguity. The proper term for me would be either jaahil or muqallid, and there is no shame to me in either term. I am not going to be asked about what I did not know on the Day of Judgment. Rather, I will be asked about what I knew and what I did with that knowledge.
The whole delegitimizing al-Qaa’idah based on lack of scholarship does not really work except with western Muslims who have just started learning about Islam. Although I do not think he has said anything specific, the person who is almost without a challenge considered the most knowledgeable shaikh alive supports a lot of al-Qaa’idah’s policies. A lot of Shinqitii scholars do not get noticed, but that region has way more knowledge than the Gulf region does. You should listen to some lectures by Muxammad al-Xassan ad-Didu. Also, Xamuud al-’Uqla ash-Shu’aibii, Ibn Jibriin, Abuu Muxammad al-Maqdisii, and numerous others with legitimate authority and “classical training” (what exactly do Westerners mean when they try to use this term? University training?). Ibn al-Cuthaimiin was actually maybe more supportive of certain things than even Abuu Muxammad if you exclude rebelling against the Saudi government.
Visit tawhed.ws and just copy and paste names into search engines and check the qualifications of the authors if you think I am just blowing smoke.
Abu Talxah al-Amrikii said
The following is a link to about 200 books which you might benefit from reading. Almost all of them are in English. If you want to understand jihaad, then read Mashari al-Ashwaq ila Masari al-Ushaaq by bin an-Nuxaas. The Arabic version is better, but the English one is there too:
http://www.zshare.net/download/76875475a74a3e7e
Ibn Siqilli said
As with all big universities, one will find a variety of professors: some good, some bad, some mediocre, some above average, some excellent. Doubtless if one were to have stuck it out a bit longer, they would have discovered that.
Your comments about the History professor are ridiculous. Isma’ili Shi’i Islam is that professor’s specialty, but generally it is medieval Muslim and Islamicate societies and history. I understand that it is hard to accept the fact that Muslim societies and the tradition itself are much broader than the narrow definition you and your fellows accept (and one that you have bolstered with the creation of an imagined past, to use B. Anderson).
As for the discussion of terminology, I am additionally amused that you spent so much time on what was clearly not meant as a serious, per se, comment. Historically, of course, a qadi was not always very knowledgeable. Theoretically, however, a qadi would have some degree of knowledge in order to enable him to carry out his duties.
Sa’id’s conception of Orientalism, the one that dominates the scholarly discussion and debate, is not about “Occidentalizing” Muslims or “Easterners” at all. The more sophisticated critiques of it are also not based on this claim. Nor do I seek to “Occidentalize” Muslims or “influence” them. Frankly, the vast majority hardly need to be “influenced” to reject Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and allies. You all seem to alienate people all by yourself. The sense of accomplishment must be amazing.
Ibn Siqilli said
Thank you for the link. I found and downloaded your uploaded collection some days ago.
Ibn Siqilli said
The classical and medieval scholars you cite are, of course, well known. Your interpretations/presentations of them, however, are hardly uncontested.
Your citation of two scholars affiliated with the Saudi monarchy is quite interesting. The caveat for Ibn ‘Uthaymin is a big one. Of course, such ‘ulama have, before September 11, 2001, long supported “rebellion (potentially) abroad, but obedience at home,” to use Prof. Madawi al-Rasheed’s phrase.
Shu’aybi represents, as you should know, a very specific vein of thought not shared by all Saudi Salafis, let alone Salafis at large.
Abu Muhammad is accepted as a scholar by those inclined to support his ideology, though his criticisms of the “Shaykh of the Slaughterer,” the “Z”, spread some fitna.
A more accurate term for education of scholars would, perhaps, be “formal training,” though “classical” generally refers to, at least when I use it, the long-standing tradition(s) of a certain type/mode of education. This need not be in a seminary per se. Regardless, most of the Al-Qa’ida boys don’t have any form of formal religious education that would enable them to pontificate as they do. You may not want to believe this. I understand it is hard for armchair types to accept. I feel your pain. Actually, that last statement was a falsehood.
Ibn Siqilli said
Correction: Most of the AQ boys can pontificate (anyone can), but their lack of actual credentials prevents anyone from taking them seriously.
Abu Talxah al-Amrikii said
Al-Qaa’idah’s problem is not with credentials, but it is with helping those who have them escape before they are imprisoned. There are an awful lot of scholars who support the efforts of Al-Qaa’idah who are behind bars in various countries right now. A military organization does not need religious credentials so long as those who have religious credentials voice support for them.
Additionally, while Al-Qaa’idah the organization might be fairly exclusive in whom it allows in and whom it allows to represent it, the global jihaad movement is fairly inclusive, and all kinds of different groups back it. Even a lot of the Jadiidiyyah back most efforts of jihaad which do not entail rebelling against some group.
I think the most promising development over the next decade or so will be the revival of the Madhaahib. In Pakistan a lot of the scholars are beginning to actually go back to Xanafii fiqh rather than Pakistani fiqh, and this is a promising development. I think Somalia and Malaysia have the potential to revive the Shafi’ii madhab based on developments in both regions.
I think the death of Saudi Salafism is imminent, and the revival of regular Salafism is at hand. The extremes of the Salafi movement are sort of being broken off at the moment, even though the movement itself is growing.
Most “Salafi” scholars in the accurate sense of the word do not necessarily think of that term when they label themselves. While various groups in the movement have actually restricted what they view as valid opinions, the overall trend seems to be one of creating greater tolerance on matters of fiqh. I think you will start to witness the emergence of the Xanafii Salafis, the Shafi’ii Salafis, etc. over the next few years.
It might take the form of the names above, or it might simply be that the people who use the word Salafi without a madhab in the name begin to call themselves Shafi’ii, Malikii, Xanafii, etc.
I also think that Western efforts to divide the mujaahidiin has played a large part in forcing the movement out of an almost exclusively Hambalii Salafii base. TTP is certainly not Hambalii, and the mujaahidiin who traveled there have actually found that it is impossible for them to marry the daughters of their companions, because they are not Xanafii.
I guess it is fair to say that the global jihaad movement is going through what America went through as immigrants started to pour in from all over the world.
The movement for jihaad is neither as restrictive, nor takfir oriented as most Western analysts try to portray. Most Muslims do not actually have a problem with making takfir of the groups which Al-Qaa’idah makes takfir of. In fact, the average Muslim around the world tends to be looser with takfir than Al-Qaa’idah.
If you look to the various Muslim circles, then you will find the the strongest debate on the recent attack on the Axmadiyyah occurred within the jihaadii circles. The average Pakistani was either indifferent toward it or they thought positively of it, and the media was almost silent on the matter.
Hizb ut-Tahrir which is extremely popular in the eastern half of the Muslim world makes takfir of virtually all the people which al-Qaa’idah makes takfir of.
The world seems to have forgotten that there was parading in the streets of every Muslim city in the world on September 11th, 2001. When a poll was conducted in the Muslim world post 9-11 on “Who do you trust to always do the right thing?” Usaamah bin Laadin came in first place. In Iraq the people are flocking back into Al-Qaa’idah and other organizations.
Even the Ash’ariis are trying to pretend that the mujaahidiin in various places are mostly from their Caqiidah. There might be majority Maturidiis in some places, but the Ash’ariis are almost non-existent in the lands of jihaad. However, the ones in Philadelphia are certainly trying to claim their group is fighting jihaad in various places.
This might be highly disorganized, but it was written in between various activities, so please forgive me for that.
Ibn Siqilli said
Indeed there are some ‘ulama who support parts of what AQ espouses and are currently imprisoned. There are also many ‘ulama who do not support AQ’s ideology. Do you believe them all to be tools of a state, hypocrites, etc.?
Certainly takfir is not limited to jihadi-takfiris. However, many jihadis have made takfir, a very broad takfir to boot, a key element of their ideology. There is of course no unity even among jihadis about what takfir requires. The dispute between Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi showed this.
Your views of the transnational jihadi movement seem to be closer to Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and others who opposed the excessive doctrinarianism of some in the “jihadi current.”
The term “Salafi” is a contested one and, I would agree, is often used in a very loose and sometimes careless way among certain segments of the academe and policy circles, as well as among Muslims. Whether or not there is a “regular Salafism” is also debatable.
I think it is also possible to question whether or not there is a unified transnational jihadi movement per se, as there are disagreement over a number of issues (as well as agreement, of course). A number of jihadi-takfiris opposed AQ Central’s endorsement of the so-called “Islamic” State of Iraq, such as Shaykh Hamid al-’Ali.
Ibn Siqilli said
I also agree that the transnational jihadi-takfiri movement(s) cannot be boiled down to being “Salafi” or “Hanbali” exclusively.
I assume you meant “Hanbali” after the great Sunni scholar and not “Hambali”.
Abu Talxah al-Amrikii said
With regard to Hambalii vs. Hanbalii, the ‘nuun’ before a ‘baa’ is pronounced like a ‘miim’ when one reads the Qur’aan, so sometimes I accidentally write things in that manner.
With regards to ‘ulamaa who do not support AQ, then their status as a Muslim has nothing to do with their support of AQ. If they have done something which is kufr and the impediments of takfir are accounted for, then they are kuffaar, and if not, then they are Muslims. Some are definitely tools of the state like Fawzaan, but others are more neutral or even against it. Hizb ut-Tahrir does not support AQ, but they are not supportive of the states either.
With regard to general populations, then excuses such as ignorance and other things are not to be applied when they take up arms. They are fought until they have been defeated, and then they can be sorted out individually afterward. This is what occurred during the time of Abu Bakr when he fought the people who did not pay zakaat and the followers of the false prophets.
It is really quite the ridiculous notion that you should have to establish the xujjah against each individual in an army before you fight them. That is simply impossible, and that was never an understanding that anyone had until the last couple of decades.
Believe it or not I spend a lot more time arguing in favor of matters that I disagree with than ones which I agree with. However, the situation of the Muslims today is one which has never existed. Naturally a wide array of ikhtilaf would occur in such a situation. This is the reason for bin Taimiyyah’s significance, because the situation during his time is the closest one to that which we have today. Simply because I do not agree with something does not mean that I do not respect the opinion.
Abu Muxammad al-Maqdisii frequently disagrees with al-Qaa’idah’s actions, but that does not prevent him from supporting them, nor them from supporting him. He recently mentioned his disapproval of the Christmas Day operation, although from a strategic perspective rather than an Islamic perspective.
With regard to the ISI, then I think the change in tactics is one which reflects an ideological change rather than a change in strategic understandings. The Sunni population in Iraq is largely supportive of operations against the Iraqi army and the Americans, but they are not supportive of bombs in markets and other such things. They call the first kind of attack a “jihaadii operation” and the latter they call an “irhaabii operation.”
The sort of irreconcilable jihaadii groups such as HAMAS seem to be dying out right now. The vast majority of differences are ones which are worked around easily. The Taliban and Al-Qaa’idah have probably the most polarized view of things in the legitimate jihaadii movement (excludes groups like HAMAS and the former PLO which just exploited jihaad for political reasons), but they still work with one another.
Ibn Siqilli said
What do you believe should happen to Shi’is in a reconfigured neo-”caliphate”?
The general Iraqi Sunni population doesn’t seem to be as supportive as you suggest of the ISI/AQI.
Do you support Hizb ut-Tahrir?
What is your view of Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s criticisms of AQ and its views on jihad?
Ibn Siqilli said
The popularity of AQ and Usama bin Laden has, generally speaking, steadily declined since September 11, 2001.
Abu Talxah al-Amrikii said
I do not really have any clue what is to be done with a large group of innovators. The Saxaabah left the Khawaarij alone until they began killing people. Bin Taimiyyah said in Majmuu’ al-Fataawa that the innovator who calls to innovation is to be executed, but I am having trouble locating the exact quote. It is in the same general area when he talks about killing the Khawaarij. However, it is not an issue I have given much time. He differentiates between the one who calls to innovation and the one who is upon innovation in this matter.
Additionally, it is always better to err on the side of mercy.
HT is good in some things, but they have huge problems with other things. They used to have a very strange Caqiidah, but now they have no official Caqiidah. Also, they used to be very critical of the mujaahidiin, but recently I have heard some people in their Australian chapter openly calling for jihaad in Afghanistan and other places, and saying that this was the solution to the Ummah’s problems.
If they ever achieve anything, then alxamdulillah it is not impossible. I sort of ruined HT’s efforts over the last year in the area I live in. They tried to recruit me, so I went and looked them up and found some of their stranger opinions. The leader of HT in this area did not deny these opinions as some of the Aussie HT members have, so I went around telling everyone to be careful of his organization.
They are very well organized and they have all kinds of front organizations and secret recruiting practices, but at the end of the day they don’t really do anything. Their methodology has virtually no flexibility and it does not reflect a basic understanding of matters which are tawqifiyyah and objectives which have multiple paths. There way very well could be the way the khalifah returns, but it is simply not likely.
I am not referring to the ISI/AQI when I refer to support. Rather I am referring to the overall jihaad in Iraq.
Qaradawi said that Muslims should join the American army in order to fight the Taliban, so in all likelihood his blood his xalaal and he is a muxarib, because the one who offers encouragement to the enemy is a muxarib by the ijmac. It is one thing to criticize something, but it is another thing to permit the shedding of a Muslim’s blood. Also, Qaradawi’s opinions change based on whether the blood of someone being spilled is Arab or not. His opinions on Palestine demonstrate his inconsistency.
He frequently goes against the ijmac on virtually any kind of issue, and only the Ikhwaaniis take him seriously. He is basically the shaikh that people go to when they want to do something xaraam, but they do not want to feel bad about doing it.
I do not know specifically how he has criticized Al-Qaa’idah other than declaring their blood to be xalaal, and that the kuffaar should be allowed to kill them, and that the Muslims should aid the kuffaar in this. However, this opinion coupled with all of his other shaadh opinions are enough for me to dismiss him completely.
I just sent a question on Qaradawi to Abuu Muxammad’s website to see what his status might be. However, I think the shaikh might be having some difficulty with certain statements due to his current situation, so I do not expect a straightforward answer.
Ibn Siqilli said
I believe Qaradawi said that it was permissible for American Muslims to join the U.S. military, which is somewhat different from saying that they “should” join it.
What is your view of the former Sahwa ‘ulama such as Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-’Awdah?
Why have you decided not to make hijrah?
Do you really believe Gadahn to be qualified to discuss religious issues as a “shaykh”? If so, what are his exact qualifications?
Abu Talxah al-Amrikii said
Here is what Qaradawii agreed to: “The Muslim (soldier) must perform his duty in this fight despite the feeling of uneasiness of ‘fighting
without discriminating’.” The full fatwa can be found in the library I posted under the “Tawhed.net” folder and then under the “jihaad” folder. The file name is “Fatwa to fight muslims.pdf”
Salman al-’Awdah quite clearly changed his mind about a lot of things after things became difficult for him. His recent fatwa on Somalia (also a fatwa with Qaradawi) reflects a lack of understanding of the situation. Somalia would probably have about 1,000 more muhaajiruun right now if the scholars who were busy issuing fataawa about it had also bothered to learn about it.
I do not know too much about shaikh Safar other than what his student Ali at-Tamimi has mentioned in his lectures, and what his friends who still live in this area mention. I did not know him personally, but those who are of a certain age group in Northern Virginia all attended his lectures.
I have not decided not to make hijrah. When I am able to make it, then I will, but until then I am stuck here. I have had quite a bit of difficulty with various legal documents needed for travel. In sha’a Allah, I should be gone within a year or so.
The obligation of hijrah was about 99% of my decision to drop out of GMU. My grades were fine, and I got all of the credits I did not want to deal with out of the way in high school (math, English, etc.).
I do not have any clue what Gadahn’s credentials are. He might be a shaikh. He might not be. I was merely mentioning that he is getting old enough that people might address him as “shaikh” out of respect. I have never heard him say anything that would require an ijaazah.
If you want to see an American mujaahid who is actually on track to becoming a shaikh, then keep your eyes on Abuu Mansuur. He memorized the Qur’aan in just 8 months. Also, he REALLY memorized it. In Somalia a xaafidh of Qur’aan is someone who knows it without any mistakes. A xaafidh in America might know most of the Qur’an but his mistakes might also fill 20 pages. Overseas they say, “A xaafidh in America is not really a xaafidh.”
Ibn Siqilli said
As I thought, Qaradawi was addressing Muslims who were already in the U.S. military. This is different from stating that Muslims, in his juridical view, who are not in the military should join it.
Gadahn and other AQ “shaykhs” often pontificate about the “religious duties” of Muslims, despite the fact that most of them have little to no real religious expertise.
Re: Abu Mansur al-Amriki: Memorizing the Qur’an is, of course, a praiseworthy and indeed amazing accomplishment. Is this, coupled with memorization of some ahadith, however, enough to really be a true shaykh in the sense of religious authority in your view? If not, what else does he need to accomplish in order to reach that status?
Abu Talxah al-Amrikii said
Someone is a scholar when other scholars say he is a scholar. It is not about memorization necessarily. An ijaazah is permission to teach a subject. I do not know how close he is in terms of knowledge to becoming a shaikh, but he is certainly on a good path to say the least alxamdulillah.
That being said, the nature of an ijaazah would make it very difficult for some shuyuukh to list, due to pressure that would be put on their teachers. I do not think I have ever heard Adam Gadahn come remotely close to issuing a religious verdict. What he does is more political and militaristic in nature.
The sort of Jadiidii understanding of who is qualified for what is not one that is held by the rest of the ummah. Simply because a scholar does not have his own TV shows and his works are not published by Dar us-Salaam does not mean that an ijaazah from him/her is invalid.
This is why the Jadiidiyyah have a problem with Anwar al-Awlaki’s credentials, but the rest of the Ummah does not. All of his ijaazah come from lesser known shuyuukh or they come from people who are “off the minhaj.”
If you can provide specific statements by someone that is not qualified to say what they said, then I will look at that, but I really cannot comment on a generalization that I have not witnessed myself. Also, quite frankly, even if you find something, then I am probably not going to be qualified to comment on it anyway.
Jorge Mata said
hi, Mr Abu Talxah al-Amrikii. Can you please tell me how to be updated of your book collection? I mean, I’d like to download each book you add to your collection, and don’t know how to be notified of it.
Besides, I’d like to talk privately to you. Can you please send an e-mail to atlanticpacificstudiesgroup@yahoo.com?
Thanks,
JM
Exclusive Interview with Abū Talḥah al-Amrīkī of Revolution Muslim « al-Maktabah – المكتبة said
[...] student at Indiana University) and Abū Talḥah al-Amrīkī in the comments section of an earlier post about Taqī ad-Dīn Ibn Taymīyyah, one of the most prominent and respected figures in the broad [...]
Ibn Siqilli said
Mr. Zachary Chesser is currently sitting in U.S. federal lock-up, so he is unlikely to be able to respond to your query.